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INTRODUCTION 
There have been only a few instances in the history of the United States 
when the conduct of the President has drawn the legitimate attention of 
criminal prosecutors. 
In 1973, President Richard Nixon came under scrutiny when several of his 
aides were convicted of crimes stemming from “a massive campaign of political 
spying and sabotage conducted on behalf of” the President’s 1972 reelection 
effort.1 A special prosecutor was appointed to investigate Nixon’s involvement, 
before being fired by Nixon himself in the “Saturday Night Massacre.”2 
Several months later, after the Supreme Court held that the President could 
not claim privilege over taped conversations between he and his aides,3 the 
House Judiciary Committee passed the first of three articles of impeachment. 
Rather than face trial in the Senate, Nixon resigned, becoming the first and 
only U.S. President to resign the office. While Nixon’s resignation relieved 
prosecutors of the need to test whether they were constitutionally permitted 
 
1 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-sabotaged-
democrats/2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html?utm_term=.308666eb0b45 
[https://perma.cc/6LPE-T6N6]. 
2 See George Lardner Jr., Cox is Chosen as Special Prosecutor, WASH. POST (May 19, 1973), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cox-is-chosen-as-special-
prosecutor/2012/06/04/gJQAEhPDJV_story.html?utm_term=.8b91aeeb716e 
[https://perma.cc/9E9D-AQE4]; Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, 





3 See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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to indict the President while he remained in office, the special prosecutor’s 
staff carefully considered the bounds of the President’s immunity in the 
months leading up to Nixon’s departure.4 Watergate thus provided the initial 
battleground for constitutional law scholars to debate the President’s 
amenability to indictment and criminal process. 
In 1994, an Independent Counsel was appointed to investigate President 
Bill Clinton’s involvement in a failed Arkansas real estate deal dubbed 
“Whitewater.”5 The investigation proceeded in several phases over the 
succeeding four years, largely under the leadership of Kenneth Starr, a former 
federal judge who served as Solicitor General during the George H.W. Bush 
Administration.6 While the Clintons were never charged in connection with 
the Whitewater matter, Starr’s investigation eventually expanded to 
encompass several other controversies, including the firing of White House 
travel office employees and, most notably, President Clinton’s sexual 
relationship with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky.7 Starr’s 
report on the Lewinsky matter ultimately concluded that President Clinton 
committed perjury and obstruction of justice through various public 
statements he made regarding the alleged affair8—charges for which Clinton 
was eventually acquitted at an impeachment trial.9 Although Starr ultimately 
chose not to pursue an indictment against Clinton, he commissioned a report 
 
4 See Memorandum from Carl B. Feldbaum et al., Assistant Special Prosecutor, to Leon 
Jaworski, Special Prosecutor, Re: Recommendation for Action by the Watergate Grand Jury 1-9 
(Feb. 12, 1974) (concluding that the President could be compelled to appear before the Watergate 
Grand Jury). Nixon’s allies in the Justice Department also considered the issue of presidential 
immunity as the Watergate Scandal unfolded, producing a memorandum that concluded the 
President was not amenable to indictment while in office. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., 
Assistant Atty Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Amenability of the President, Vice President, and 
other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office 32 (Sep. 24, 1973) [hereinafter 
1973 OLC Memo]. 
President Ford later granted Nixon a “full, free, and absolute pardon” for all crimes he 
committed or may have committed while he was in office. See Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 
32601 (Sept. 10, 1974). 
5 Whitewater Time Line, WASH. POST (1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/whitewater/timeline.htm [https://perma.cc/46U9-HLBQ]. 
6 Douglas Jehl, Building on Whitewater Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/11/us/building-on-whitewater-investigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/8M57-SXGV]. 
7 Susan Schmidt, Peter Baker, & Toni Lacy, Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie, WASH. POST (Jan. 
20, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/clinton012198.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CQZ3-FAND]. 
8 See generally KENNETH W. STARR, REFERRAL FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH 
W. STARR IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, 
SECTION 595(C), H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310, at 310 (1998) (finding that Clinton had “made false 
statements about whether he had lied under oath or otherwise obstructed justice”). 
9 Alison Mitchell, Clinton Acquitted Decisively: No Majority for Either Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/13/us/president-s-acquittal-overview-clinton-acquitted-decisively-no-
majority-for.html [https://perma.cc/B2ZH-KWBC]. 
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on the indictability of the President, which concluded the Independent 
Counsel’s office was legally permitted to indict Clinton.10 At the same time, 
Clinton’s Justice Department prepared its own memorandum opining on the 
issue and concluded the opposite, largely drawing from the work of a 
memorandum prepared by the Nixon Administration that found the same.11 
The Starr investigation generated a renewed battle among commentators 
over the question of presidential immunity12.13 
This issue became relevant again in June 2017, when Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller14 began investigating current President Donald Trump for 
obstruction of justice related to his campaign’s contacts with Russian 
diplomats15—an investigation that ultimately concluded without 
recommending criminal action against the President.16 Nevertheless, as 
several of Trump’s current and former associates pled guilty, suffered 
convictions, or were indicted as a result of the Mueller probe,17 the debate 
 
10 See Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ill. College of Law, to 
Kenneth W. Starr, Indep. Counsel, Re: Indictability of the President 44-46 (May 13, 1998) (“The 
decision to prosecute or not prosecute [the President] . . . . lies with the Independent Counsel . . . .”). 
11 See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 
222, 258-60 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 OLC Memo] (“[W]e believe that the Constitution requires 
recognition of a presidential immunity from indictment . . . while the President is in office.”). 
12 Throughout this Comment, I use the term “presidential immunity” to mean the President’s 
immunity from indictment and/or criminal process. 
13 President Clinton avoided indictment after leaving office by accepting immunity in 
exchange for admitting that he gave false testimony under oath and agreeing to surrender his law 
license for five years. Neil A. Lewis, Exiting Job, Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
20, 2001), http://movies2.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/politics/20CLIN.html [https://perma.cc/H62L-
9LD3]. Robert Ray, who succeeded Ken Starr as the Independent Counsel, previously stated that 
he would wait until Clinton left office before deciding on indictment to avoid a constitutional 
challenge. See Independent Counsel Says Clinton Probe Continues; He considers an indictment after 
president’s term ends, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2000), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-
apr-11-mn-18403-story.html [https://perma.cc/7KF9-JKKW] (“Independent counsel Robert W. 
Ray considers the investigation of President Clinton’s relationship with Monica S. Lewinsky an 
‘open matter’ and is actively considering seeking an indictment against the president after he leaves 
office next January.”). 
14 Appointment of Special Counsel, DEPT. OF JUSTICE (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel [https://perma.cc/4HVY-5ZTJ]. 
15 Devlin Barrett et. al, Special Counsel is Investigating Trump for Possible Obstruction of Justice, 




16 See Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 
Presidential Election 8-10 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y9D-3JK8]. 
17 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Spencer S. Hsu, Former Trump Campaign Official Rick Gates Pleads 
Guilty to 2 Charges, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/former-
trump-campaign-official-rick-gates-expected-to-plead-guilty-and-cooperate-with-special-counsel-
in-probe-of-russian-election-interference/2018/02/23/ceaaeac8-16b4-11e8-b681-
2d4d462a1921_story.html?utm_term=.044ac2b12b39 [https://perma.cc/5SCT-TNZP] (“Rick Gates, 
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over presidential immunity once again came to the forefront.18 This argument 
is even more important now because, unlike in the cases of Nixon and 
Clinton, Congress is not fully controlled by the President’s opponents, 
rendering the possibility of conviction at an impeachment trial highly 
unlikely.19 Thus, to the extent prosecutors were convinced of President 
Trump’s criminality, indictment may have been the only outlet for them to 
seek justice against him. 
The three controversies discussed above have produced voluminous 
scholarship on the question of whether a sitting president is amenable to 
indictment and criminal process, some of which I discuss in Part I. In several 
 
a former top official in President Trump’s campaign, pleaded guilty . . . to conspiracy and lying to 
the FBI . . . .”); Sharon LaFraniere, Paul Manafort, Trump’s Former Campaign Chairman, Guilty of 8 
Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/us/politics/paul-
manafort-trial-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/YDD5-MJKW] (reporting the conviction of former 
Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort); Sharon LaFraniere & Zach Montague, Roger Stone is 
Convicted of Impeding Investigations in a Bid to Protect Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/politics/roger-stone-trial-guilty.html 
[https://perma.cc/F7N4-U2YQ] (reporting the conviction of longtime Trump adviser Roger Stone); 
Erica Orden et. al, Michael Cohen Pleads Guilty, Says He Lied About Trump’s Knowledge of Moscow 
Project, CNN (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/29/politics/michael-cohen-guilty-plea-
misleading-congress/index.html [https://perma.cc/4JSJ-UNKS] (describing the guilty plea of 
Trump’s former attorney Michael Cohen); Michael D. Shear & Adam Goldman, Michael Flynn 
Pleads Guilty to Lying to the F.B.I. and Will Cooperate with Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/politics/michael-flynn-guilty-russia-investigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WM5-YLXT] (“President Trump’s former national security adviser, Michael T. 
Flynn, pleaded guilty on Friday to lying to the F.B.I . . . .”) ; Tom Winter et. al, Ex-Trump Adviser 
George Papadopoulos Pleads Guilty in Mueller’s Russia Probe, NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-campaign-adviser-george-papadopoulos-pleads-
guilty-lying-n815596 [https://perma.cc/5WNH-EM5W] (reporting former Trump campaign 
advisor George Papadopoulos’s cooperation agreement with Robert Mueller) . 
18 See generally, Corey Brettschneider, Yes, It’s Possible to Indict a Sitting U.S. President. Here’s Why., WASH. 
POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/08/29/yes-its-
possible-to-indict-a-sitting-u-s-president-heres-why/?utm_term=.7791e090446b [https://perma.cc/9GH4-
RCXA] (“As President Trump faces deepening legal problems, the country must confront a vital question: 
Does the Constitution grant a sitting president immunity from criminal prosecution?”); Garret Epps, The 
Only Way to Find Out if the President Can be Indicted, THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/presidential-indictment/560957/ 
[https://perma.cc/US7Z-FQYU] (discussing the lack of settled Constitutional law regarding presidential 
indictment and prosecution). 
19 Ed Kilgore, Republican Solidarity Will Protect Trump From Impeachment, INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 
6, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/republican-solidarity-will-protect-trump-from-
impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/DS8E-X7R3] (“There have been two successful presidential 
impeachments in U.S. history (neither of which led to a Senate conviction), and one near-impeachment 
that produced a presidential resignation. In all three cases, Congress was controlled by the president’s 
opponents.”). The unlikelihood of an impeachment conviction by a politically-aligned Senate was on 
display during President Trump’s recent impeachment trial, where Republican Senators largely made 
up their minds to acquit the President before the trial even began. See Savannah Behrmann, Rand Paul 
on Senate Trial: ‘I Don’t Think Any Republicans are Going to Vote for Impeachment’, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/16/trump-impeachment-rand-paul-said-
senators-have-made-up-their-minds/4493419002/ [https://perma.cc/AHQ6-2J7A]. 
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of these works, commentators on both sides of the issue have identified a 
critical statute of limitations problem that arises when it is assumed that a 
sitting president is unindictable. 
Suppose that a President commits a federal bribery offense in January 
20x1, the first year of his presidency. This offense is quickly exposed by the 
media, and a special counsel is appointed to investigate. By January 20x4, 
investigators have all they need to charge the President with bribery, but we 
assume, as many have argued, that any criminal process against the President 
is unavailable while he or she remains in office. Much to their dismay, 
investigators soon come to realize that Congress, wherein both houses are 
overwhelmingly controlled by the President’s party, refuses to impeach the 
President for this offense, or any other for that matter. Meanwhile, voters in 
the President’s party remain fiercely loyal to him despite the charge and, as a 
majority of the electorate, are happy to reelect him to another term beginning 
in 20x5.20 One year later, in January 20x6, prosecutors are dismayed when the 
5-year statute of limitations period for the bribery offense expires, without 
the President ever being brought to justice. Certainly this cannot be the result 
the Framers would have wanted—even though they may not have anticipated 
that extreme party polarization could render the impeachment process 
 
20 A situation not wholly unlike this unfolded recently in Israel, where incumbent Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu ran for office while facing imminent indictment for fraud, bribery, and breach of 
trust. See e.g., Isabel Kershner, With Netanyahu Facing Indictment, Israel Braces for a Wild Election, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/world/middleeast/netanyahu-indictment-
election.html [https://perma.cc/JW2M-KXXA] (noting that Prime Minister Netanyahu “still retains a 
strong base” despite “facing indictment for corruption”). While the Mueller investigation concluded 
without recommending criminal charges against President Trump, it is not unreasonable to think a 
similar situation could have unfolded in the United States had Trump faced criminal charges. Polls 
showed that Republican support for the President was largely unwavering during the Mueller 
investigation, with many GOP voters agreeing with the sentiment that the probe was a “witch hunt.” 
Domenico Montanaro, Poll: Republicans are Only Group That Mostly Sees Mueller Probe as a ‘Witch Hunt’, 
NPR (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/07/674315848/poll-republicans-are-only-group-that-
mostly-sees-mueller-probe-as-a-witch-hunt [https://perma.cc/847Z-ZJH5]. Republican voters also 
largely remained loyal to Trump after his impeachment. See Tess Bonn, Poll: 17 Percent of Republicans 
Support Trump Impeachment, Removal from Office, THE HILL (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.thehill.com/hilltv/rising/478029-poll-17-percent-of-republicans-support-trump-
impeachment-removal-from-office [https://perma.cc/HMX9-3CJ6] (discussing a poll conducted after 
President Trump’s impeachment by the House showing that only 17 percent of Republican voters 
thereafter supported his removal from office). 
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ineffective21—for it has been a principle since the founding that not even the 
President is “above the law.”22 
Foreseeing the intractability of this result, commentators arguing in favor 
of presidential immunity have theorized that, in such a case, some form of 
“tolling” could be invoked by a court to delay expiration of the applicable 
statute of limitations. For example, in his impeachment handbook, 
constitutional law scholar Charles Black stated that “an incumbent president 
cannot be put on trial in the ordinary courts for ordinary crime . . . [a] simple 
and obvious solution would be . . . to delay indictment until after his term 
[with the statute of limitations] ‘tolled’ . . . until the president’s term is 
over.”23 Likewise, Professor Akhil Amar, in one of several pieces he has 
authored arguing in favor of presidential immunity, theorized that “[t]he 
statute of limitations can be stayed” to preserve the ability to prosecute the 
President after he or she leaves office.24 Former Assistant Attorney General 
Randolph Moss, in the aforementioned 2000 OLC Memo, suggested that the 
doctrine of equitable tolling could be invoked to delay expiration of the 
statute of limitations in such a case.25 Following the logic proposed by these 
scholars, in our example above, the President could be indicted for bribery 
the minute he or she leaves office. However, no work proposing this solution 
has performed an analysis of current precedent on tolling rules to support the 
conclusion that this remedy would be available to prosecutors facing such a 
dilemma. Here, I seek to fill this gap in the scholarship by analyzing whether 
history and precedent would permit the use of some form of tolling to delay 
expiration of the statute of limitations for a crime committed by a President 
 
21 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (“[R]ise of the party 
system has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power . . . . Party 
loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend [the President’s] effective control 
into branches of government other than his own, and he may often win, as a political leader, what 
he cannot command under the Constitution.” (Jackson, J., concurring)); Eric M. Freedman, On 
Protecting Accountability, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 702 (1999) (noting “the possibility that the 
Congress might be dominated by members of the President’s political party” may frustrate the 
ability of the impeachment process to operate as it was intended). 
22 Thomas Paine, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER WRITINGS 31 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 
Random House 2003) (1776) (“[I]n America the law is king. For as in absolute governments the 
King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other.”); 
Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the 
United States, (1787), reprinted in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 236 (Kermit L. Hall 
& Mark David Hall eds. 2007) (“Add to all this, that [the President] is placed high, and is 
possessed of power far from being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his 
character; far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a 
citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.”) . 
23 CHARLES H. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 37 (1974). 
24 Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 16 (1997). 
25 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 256 & n.33 (suggesting that the statute of limitations 
may be tolled if the President cannot be indicted). 
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who is immune from criminal process. I approach this question by asking 
whether a tolling rule could be adopted to satisfy this problem grounded in 
either (1) general equitable considerations or (2) the policies and procedures 
of other federal law. 
In Part I, I discuss the legal bases furthered in support of presidential 
immunity and the practical reasons for assuming this doctrine applies to the 
current President. In Part II, I address the tolling question posed above by 
analyzing whether a court may be permitted to toll the applicable statute of 
limitations in a case against the President by relying on either general 
equitable considerations or its power to implement the policies of other 
federal law. Finally, in Part III, I provide two alternative solutions to solving 
the statute of limitations problem to the extent judicial tolling is unavailable. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY 
While presidential immunity is far from a settled issue,26 many reputable 
constitutional law scholars contend that it exists. As discussed above, the 
supposed existence of presidential immunity is what produces the important 
legal question that this Comment addresses; to the extent it exists, the 
President may be able to escape prosecution for a crime if he or she can ride 
out the statute of limitations for the offense while in office. Because I seek 
only to explore the practical realities that flow from presidential immunity, I 
will assume that it exists without evaluating the merits of its justifications. In 
this Section, I briefly discuss the historical and prudential arguments 
furthered in favor of presidential immunity and the practical reasons for 
assuming such immunity exists. In addition to informing the tolling analysis, 
these arguments are important to consider when crafting solutions to the 
statute of limitations problem (to the extent they are necessary), as any 
proposed solution must not violate the legal justifications underlying 
presidential immunity. 
A. Textual and Historical Considerations 
The Constitution provides no clear answer on whether the President is 
subject to criminal prosecution. As a result, commentators have pieced 
together evidence of how the Framers may have thought about this issue from 
various constitutional provisions. An obvious starting point is the provisions 
discussing impeachment, which address presidential wrongdoing head-on. 
 
26 Indeed, “[t]he question of whether a sitting president can be subject to criminal prosecution is ‘one 
of the great open questions of American Constitutional Law.’” Ruth Marcus, Allegations Could Lead to 
Impeachment, Prosecution, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/legal1012298.htm [https://perma.cc/5G4Y-6F5R] (quoting Akhil Amar). 
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Article I mandates that impeachment be invoked by the House of 
Representatives and tried by the Senate, with the Chief Justice presiding.27 
In addition, the Impeachment Judgment Clause states that: 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust 
or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless 
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, 
according to Law.28 
Article II confirms that the President is subject to this process for certain 
enumerated offenses and “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”29 These 
provisions indicate that the Framers anticipated misconduct by future 
Presidents and, as a consequence, provided a detailed process for effectuating 
their removal. The question that remains unanswered by these provisions is 
whether impeachment was meant to be the public’s sole remedy against the 
President’s criminal conduct while he or she is in office, or whether it was 
prescribed in addition to potential criminal prosecution. 
While the Founders clearly rejected the ancient English concept that “the 
King can do no wrong,”30 there is relatively little documentation of their views 
on oversight of the President outside of the constitutional provisions on 
impeachment. However, presidential immunity supporters have found some 
ammunition among the Founders’ communications to support the theory. For 
example, some commentators argue that the text of the Impeachment 
Judgment Clause, supported by Alexander Hamilton’s discussion of this 
provision in the Federalist Papers,31 forecloses criminal process against the 
President because, by its terms, it only contemplates indictment after 
conviction at an impeachment trial. Commentators make this argument by 
 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power 
of Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments . . . . the Chief Justice shall preside.”). 
28 Id. art. I, §3, cl. 7. 
29 Id. art. II, §4. 
30 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) (“Although we have adopted the related 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common-law fiction that ‘the king . . . is not only incapable of 
doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong,’ . . . was rejected at the birth of the Republic.”(citing 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979))). 
31 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 398-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clint Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence and honors and 
emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course 
of law.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, id. at 416 (“The President of the United States would be liable to 
be impeached, tried, and upon conviction . . . removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to 
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, id. at 464 
(stating that the President is “at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office . . . and 
to the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law.”). 
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adding emphasis to certain words (in the Impeachment Judgment Clause and 
the cited provisions from the Federalist Papers) to infer a proclamation by the 
Framers that criminal process may follow, but not precede, impeachment. By 
emphasizing “conviction” in the Impeachment Judgment Clause, for example, 
it may be argued that the Framers only sanctioned indictment of a President 
after he or she was successfully impeached.32 Similarly, emphasizing the 
various timing words in certain passages in the Federalist Papers (noted above), 
wherein Alexander Hamilton discusses criminal process against the President 
(e.g. “after having been sentenced,” “would afterwards be liable,” “subsequent 
prosecution”) may give rise to the conclusion that the approval of this process 
after Impeachment also amounted to a prohibition of this process before it.33 
Professor Akhil Amar has also cited statements by John Adams and Oliver 
Ellsworth as historical support for his position that the President may not be 
indicted.34 
However, even those commentators arguing in favor of presidential immunity 
have at times admitted that the historical evidence is conflicting,35 and provides a 
much weaker basis for the theory than prudential considerations.36 
 
32 See 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 224 (“The textual argument that the criminal 
prosecution of a person subject to removal by impeachment may not precede conviction by the 
Senate arises from the reference to the ‘Party convicted’ being liable for ‘Indictment, Trial, Judgment 
and Punishment.’”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 163 (2017) 
(noting that the text of the Impeachment Judgment Clause “may suggest a temporal limitation: first 
impeachment, then judgment and removal, then prosecution”). 
33 See Akhil Reed Amar, On Prosecuting Presidents, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 671-72, 672 nn.4 
& 5 (1999) (concluding through this argument that Hamilton supported Presidential immunity). 
34 See Amar & Kalt, supra note 24, at 16 (stating that John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth 
supported temporary immunity and believed that a sitting President could be indicted for murder 
when he is no longer President); Amar, supra note 33, at 671-72 (noting that the position “that a 
sitting President claiming the full privileges of his office may only be criminally tried by this ‘court,’ 
the Senate, sitting in impeachment and can be criminally tried elsewhere only after he has left office” 
was held firmly by both John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth). 
35 Here, as with many historical arguments on constitutional questions, “[a] century and a half 
of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt 
quotations from respected sources on each side of [the] question.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
36 Former Assistant Attorney General Randolph Moss noted in the 2000 OLC Memo that the 
likely purpose of the Impeachment Judgment Clause was to foreclose a double jeopardy argument 
by a President who was subject to criminal prosecution after being successfully impeached, and not 
to comment on the amenability of a President to indictment while in office. 2000 OLC Memo, supra 
note 11, at 224. The 1973 OLC Memo provides further historical support for this conclusion. See 1973 
OLC Memo, supra note 4, at 3-4 (citing works by Constitutional Convention member Luther 
Martin, Justice Story, and former lawyer and early commentator William Rawle as support); accord 
Scott W. Howe, The Prospect of a President Incarcerated, 2 NEXUS 86, 89 (1997) (“[T]he impeachment 
provision indicates the separate and distinct functions to be accomplished by impeachment and 
judicial prosecution, not that impeachment must precede judicial prosecution. It indicates that 
impeachment does not bar subsequent, judicial prosecution, but does not clarify whether judicial 
prosecution must precede impeachment.”). 
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B. Prudential Considerations 
While the Supreme Court has never been afforded the opportunity to 
determine whether the President is amenable to criminal prosecution, it has 
heard several cases involving past presidents that are relevant to the question. 
In each case, the Court employed a balancing methodology to determine the 
amenability of the President to judicial process in different contexts.37 And 
given that the historical and textual evidence for presidential immunity is 
weak, such a balancing test, to the extent it would be employed in determining 
the President’s amenability to criminal process, would likely be decided based 
on the weight of prudential considerations favoring or disfavoring immunity. 
Thus, prudential considerations are critical to constructing an effective 
argument in favor of presidential immunity. Here, I present the prudential 
considerations raised by commentators as weighing in favor of presidential 
immunity, which largely take the following form: (1) impeachment must be 
the sole mechanism for removing a President from office, (2) the need to 
defend against criminal charges would unduly burden the President in 
performing his or her official duties, and (3) allowing criminal process against 
the President would subject him or her to frivolous litigation from overzealous 
prosecutors. I discuss each of these arguments in turn. 
First, some commentators argue that impeachment is the only appropriate 
means for prosecuting a sitting President because, as Congress is a political 
body representing the interests of the whole nation, it is the only appropriate 
body for prosecuting and removing an official elected by all of the people. 
Permitting a prosecutor to indict the President and subject him or her to 
criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, would place the power of 
removal not with the people, through Congress, but in the hands of the 
prosecutor and jury.38 As Professor Akhil Amar contends, the need for 
accountability in exercising the momentous decision to remove a President 
 
37 The Court discussed such balancing in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, noting, 
It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of 
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. . . . But our cases also have 
established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional 
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority 
and functions of the Executive Branch.  
457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974) (“[W]e must 
weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in 
performance of the President’s responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair 
administration of criminal justice.”). 
38 See 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 231 (“A criminal trial of a sitting President, however, 
would confer upon a jury of twelve the power, in effect, to overturn this national election. ‘The 
decision to terminate this mandate . . . is more fittingly handled by the Congress than by a jury, and 
such congressional power is founded in the Constitution.’” (quoting 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 4)). 
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dictates that this power should be vested only in the Congress.39 Furthermore, 
“the impeachment process is better suited to the task” of presidential 
prosecution “than is a criminal proceeding.”40 It “allows for a much more 
flexible and stripped-down version of procedure;”41 it would conclude faster 
given there can be “no appeal from the verdict;”42 it “makes geographical 
sense” given an impeachment trial would be held down the street from the 
President’s office;43 and it would be conducted by a political body which “the 
President is already institutionally equipped to deal with.”44 
Second, presidential immunity supporters contend that subjecting the 
President to criminal process is untenable because it would hamper his or her 
ability to adequately perform the unique duties of the executive office, 
thereby arresting an entire branch of government.45 Because the President is 
entrusted with nondelegable powers, providing temporary immunity while 
he or she remains in office not only makes sense, but is critical to the proper 
functioning of the office.46 The Framers anticipated that defense against 
criminal charges would require significant mental and physical involvement 
by the defendant, and would likely provide a distraction different in manner 
and degree from those experienced by past presidents.47 Furthermore, the 
 
39 See Amar & Kalt, supra note 24, at 20 (“When a President is removed, it is not by an 
unaccountable state official or an even less accountable special prosecutor. It is done instead by the 
most august, most representative, most constitutionally elaborated, and most accountable 
deliberative body we have, the Congress . . . . Impeachment, then, is the sole means of removing a 
sitting President, and is a good one at that.”); see also BLACK, supra note 23, at 1 (“[V]oting in the 
presidential election is certainly the political choice most significant to the American people, and 
most closely attended to by them. No matter, then, can be of higher political importance than our 
considering whether, in any given instance, this act of choice is to be undone, and the chosen 
president dismissed from office in disgrace.”). 
40 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 231. 
41 Amar & Kalt, supra note 24, at 19. 
42 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 231. 
43 Amar & Kalt, supra note 24, at 19. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 12 (“When the President is substantially distracted from his job, he is half-absent and 
his job goes half-undone. If he is arrested, so too is the executive branch of the government.”); Howe, 
supra note 36, at 87 (“[I]mmunity can help to ensure that a President is undistracted from official 
duties by the need to defend against a criminal prosecution.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 
164 (“Unlike a civil action, a criminal prosecution imposes a unique kind of stigma and threat, such 
that the president’s ability to undertake his constitutionally specified tasks really would be at risk.”). 
46 See 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 229 (“[T]he institution of criminal proceedings against 
a sitting President ‘would interfere with the President’s unique official duties, most of which cannot be 
performed by anyone else.’” (quoting 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 4)); Howe, supra note 36, at 88 (“The 
President’s distraction in defending against criminal charges and in fulfilling any sentence imposed 
could impede his best efforts to make decisions that we entrust to the President alone.”). 
47 See 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 251 (“The constitutional provisions governing 
criminal prosecutions make clear the Framers’ belief that an individual’s mental and physical 
involvement and assistance in the preparation of his defense both before and during any criminal 
trial would be intense, no less so for the President than for any other defendant.”). 
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demands on the President have only increased since the founding, making 
any significant distraction more impactful now than in the past.48 For these 
reasons, the imposition of criminal charges against the President presents a 
burden on the executive branch that demands he or she be afforded temporary 
immunity from indictment. 
Third, pro-immunity commentators reason that allowing criminal process 
against the President would open the floodgates to frivolous or politically 
motivated charges from federal and state prosecutors alike.49 This 
consideration seems to hold less weight, given that there is no evidence of 
any attempts by prosecutors to bring such charges in the past50 while the 
possibility of presidential indictment remained open. Nevertheless, this 
argument relies on the premise that the consequences of an action cannot be 
observed until after it is implemented and thus, the prospect of a spike in 
criminal prosecutions against the President theoretically remains possible 
once prosecutors are certain that such an option is constitutionally permitted. 
C. Immunity Assumption 
As seen in the foregoing discussion, there are strong practical 
considerations justifying the conclusion that the President is immune from 
compulsory criminal process while in office, although this remains an open and 
as-yet-untested question. To conclude my discussion on presidential immunity, 
I note briefly why the assumption I adopt here—that the President is in fact 
immune from indictment while in office—is a reasonable one given the current 
state of affairs, regardless of one’s view of this position on the merits. 
First, this position is the one originally taken by the Justice Department 
in 1973 (in the 1973 OLC Memo) and reaffirmed in 2000 (in the 2000 OLC 
Memo)—a position that would likely bind a federal prosecutor seeking to 
 
48 Compare 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 4, at 28 (“During the past century the duties of the 
Presidency . . . have become so onerous that a President may not be able fully to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office if he had to defend a criminal prosecution.”), with Jonathan Turley, 
From Pillar to Post: The Prosecution of American Presidents, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1049, 1081 (2000) 
(acknowledging the argument that presidents may be “less important to the actual operation of the 
Executive Branch” today than they were in the eighteenth century, as “the federal government is 
now composed of a plethora of different agencies and subagencies which are run with little or no 
involvement of the White House”). 
49 See Howe, supra note 36, at 87 (arguing that denying temporary immunity would allow a 
“myriad of federal or state prosecutors throughout the country [to] bring the President to task for 
petty or politically-influenced allegations”). 
50 See id. (“Such charges might not be leveled often, as evidenced by the absence of such charges 
in the past.”); see also Turley, supra note 48, at 1087 (noting that “only three sitting Presidents in 
history have been subjected to suits for their private actions” and that “[n]o President has ever been 
formally charged with a criminal violation” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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indict the President in the future.51 Second, as seen throughout the 
scholarship on presidential immunity discussed above, the affirmative 
position on presidential immunity is one often taken by conservative legal 
scholars. Given that this question would ultimately be decided by the 
Supreme Court, which in its current form maintains a strong conservative 
majority, it is reasonable to assume that the current justices, (without delving 
in-depth into their potential views on the subject) would most likely decide 
in favor of presidential immunity.52 Given both of these realities, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the current position of the highest courts and 
prosecutorial agencies is that the President is immune from indictment while 
in office. This makes the tolling inquiry critical to determining whether 
presidential immunity may, in certain instances, render the President “above 
the law,” or whether it merely delays the government’s ability to bring the 
President to justice. 
II. THE TOLLING QUESTION 
Having discussed the arguments in favor of presidential immunity, and 
the reasons for assuming this immunity obtains for the current Executive, I 
now turn to the question this Comment seeks to answer: whether a tolling 
rule could be invoked to delay expiration of the statute of limitations for a 
crime committed by the President while he or she is immune from criminal 
 
51 See Adam Liptak, A Constitutional Puzzle: Can the President Be Indicted?, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/us/politics/a-constitutional-puzzle-can-the-president-be-
indicted.html [https://perma.cc/CDK4-K3T6] (“The Justice Department’s regulations require Mr. 
Mueller, the special counsel, to follow the department’s ‘rules, regulations, procedures, practices, and 
policies.’ If the [1973 and 2000 OLC] memos bind Mr. Mueller, it would seem he could not indict Mr. 
Trump, no matter what he uncovered.”); see also Paul Callan, Prosecutors’ Best Move: Charge Trump and 
Seal the Indictment, CNN (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/17/opinions/prosecutors-best-
move-a-sealed-indictment-vs-trump-callan/index.html [https://perma.cc/R8CL-CM8M] (“Mueller 
and the New York Southern District prosecutors are bound by a Justice Department policy against 
indicting a sitting president.”). 
52 During Justice Kavanaugh’s nomination process in 2018, politicians and legal scholars called 
attention to previous articles he had written on the subject of presidential prosecution. See Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 
1459-62 (2009)(discussing the merits of providing sitting presidents with temporary deferrals of civil 
suits, criminal prosecutions, and criminal investigations); Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the 
Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2178 (1998) (describing the adversarial relationship between a 
sitting president and an independent counsel as a “fundamental flaw,” instead advocating for clearer roles 
for Congress and the President in policing executive conduct). Commentators debated whether these 
articles tipped Kavanaugh’s hand as to where he stands on the President’s amenability to indictment. See 
Salvador Rizzo, Does Brett Kavanaugh Think the President is Immune from Criminal Charges?, WASH. POST 
(July 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/07/11/does-brett-
kavanaugh-think-the-president-is-immune-from-criminal-charges/?utm_term=.7e3e4c21053a 
[https://perma.cc/E6CB-PHE3] (concluding that Kavanaugh’s work does not support an indisputable 
assumption that he believes the Constitution prohibits the indictment of the President). 
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prosecution. I follow two paths to answering this question. First, I consider 
whether a court facing such a case would have the ability to toll the applicable 
statute of limitations in order to implement general equitable principles. In 
other words, I ask whether a court could invoke the doctrine of equitable 
tolling to preserve prosecution against the President. In Section II.B, I 
address this question by first considering whether equitable tolling would be 
available in a criminal prosecution in the first instance, and then applying 
existing precedent on equitable tolling to the circumstances of our 
hypothetical case against a former President. This analysis responds to the 
2000 OLC Memo, which specifically pointed to equitable tolling as a doctrine 
that could be used to solve the statute of limitations problem. Next, I consider 
whether a court could adopt a novel tolling rule to preserve charges against 
the President in order to implement the policies of other federal law. In 
Section II.C, I address this question by discussing when and how federal 
courts have adopted tolling rules in the past to effectuate the provisions of 
other federal law, and applying the logic of these cases to the hypothetical 
case against a former President facing otherwise time-barred charges. This 
analysis responds to commentators such as Charles Black and Professor Akhil 
Amar, who have hypothesized that some form of tolling would solve the 
potential statute of limitations problem without specifying an existing tolling 
doctrine that a court should or could employ. 
As noted above, the answer to the tolling question is critical to 
determining whether presidential immunity can coexist with enforcement of 
the rule of law. To the extent the President can evade prosecution for a crime 
merely by ascension to the office, certainly he or she could not be considered 
“an ordinary citizen differing from his or her peers only in being temporarily 
delegated to perform certain functions.”53 
A. Criminal Statutes of Limitations 
Before addressing the tolling question as outlined above, I briefly discuss 
the traditional interests served by criminal statutes of limitations, which 
discussion will inform both prongs of the analysis I pursue in the latter parts 
of this Comment. 
 
53 Freedman, supra note 21, at 705. 
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Criminal statutes of limitations “have been a hallmark of American law 
since the Founding.”54 Colonies enacted these statutes as early as 1652,55 and 
a limitations period was adopted for most federal crimes in 1790.56 This 
practice distinguished the United States from England, “where the doctrine 
that ‘no lapse bars the King’ has made statutes imposing limitations on 
criminal prosecutions extremely rare.”57 The purpose of criminal statutes of 
limitations is to “limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed 
period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has 
decided to punish by criminal sanctions.”58 They represent a “legislative 
determination that the purposes of criminal law may best be served under 
some circumstances by limiting the power to proceed against an alleged 
criminal.”59 This determination is supported by two sets of interests: (1) 
promoting fairness and protecting repose by preventing defendants from 
having to defend themselves against old charges, and (2) improving efficiency 
and ensuring predictability by encouraging the government to promptly 
investigate suspected criminal activity.60 
1. Fairness, Accuracy, and Repose 
First, criminal limitations periods “protect individuals from having to 
defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become 
obscured by the passage of time.”61 Protecting defendants in this way not only 
ensures accuracy by eliminating reliance on stale evidence but also serves to 
“promote individual and societal interests in repose.”62 
 
54 Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 115 
(2008). The use of criminal statutes of limitations followed from ancient Roman law, which barred 
prosecution of most offenses after twenty years. Most civil law countries followed this practice and 
now impose limitations periods which largely vary with the seriousness of the crime. Id. at 121. 
55 See Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 
U. PA. L. REV. 630, 631 (1954) [hereinafter The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law] (citing 
WHITMORE, COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 163 (1889), which provided a one-year 
general limitation on crimes). 
56 Id. at 631. The original rule provided for a general two-year limitations period for most 
federal crimes, which subsequently rose to three years in 1876 and five years in 1954, where it remains 
today. Powell, supra note 54, at 116. 
57 United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 125 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Powell, supra note 54, at 121 
n.40 (“Britain and Canada continue to impose no statutory restriction on the government’s delay in 
indicting most crimes.”). 
58 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970). 
59 The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 55, at 630. 
60 See Powell, supra note 54, at 115-16 (describing the two major sets of interests that limitations 
theories are intended to further). 
61 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114. 
62 Powell, supra note 54, at 129; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) 
(“[Statutes of limitations] are made for the repose of society and the protection of those who may 
[during the limitation] . . . have lost their means of defence.” (citation omitted)). 
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“Authorities on the law of evidence and psychologists recognize that there 
is a relation between the passage of time and the extent of accuracy and 
memory,”63 and courts have acknowledged that this reality in part drives the 
evidentiary justification for statutes of limitations.64 A defendant’s ability to 
prepare a successful defense is undeniably impaired when the state decides to 
prosecute him or her long after the alleged criminal act.65 Witnesses that are 
important to the defendant’s claims may die or move away,66 critical records 
may be lost or destroyed,67 memories fade,68 and without a fair warning of the 
charges against him or her, a defendant has no notice of the need to preserve 
exculpatory evidence.69 These problems demonstrates that limitations periods 
are relevant to almost any type of offense, as defendants will always need to 
rely on some amount of witness testimony or documentary evidence to 
demonstrate their innocence, the availability of each of which is risked when 
prosecution is delayed for a significant time.70 The potential loss of important 
evidence also erodes confidence in the ability of the government to achieve a 
proper outcome: “[w]here material evidence has become unavailable, [the] 
prosecution is also less likely to produce a reliable result, and the public 
interest in the prosecution is therefore diminished.”71 
 
63 The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 55, at 637 (footnotes omitted). 
64 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003) (explaining that the judgment that “after 
a certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict” typically rests in part on “evidentiary 
concerns—for example, concern that the passage of time has eroded memories or made witnesses or 
other evidence unavailable”). 
65 See Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution 
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 
129, 141 (1993) (“With passing time, a defendant faces an increasingly difficult task in formulating 
and mounting an effective defense.”); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Between Due Process and Forgiveness: 
Revisiting Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 423, 426 (2013) (“At the criminal level, 
defendants may be unable to mount a defense many years after the offense.”). 
66 The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 55, at 632; see also P. G. Barton, Why 
Limitations in the Criminal Code?, 40 CRIM. L.Q. 188, 190 (1997) (“As time passes . . . witnesses move 
away or die.”). 
67 The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 55, at 632. 
68 Id.; see also Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 65, at 141 (“[W]ith the passage of time . . . 
memories fade.”). 
69 See Stogner, 539 U.S. at 611 (2003)(describing laws that create new criminal limitation 
periods as “depriv[ing] the defendant of the fair warning . . . that might have led him to preserve 
exculpatory evidence” (internal quotations omitted)). 
70 Notwithstanding their relevance to nearly all types of offenses, Congress and the states have 
decided for various reasons that certain crimes, such as murder, should not be subject to a limitations 
period. See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31253, STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW 17-21 (2017) (listing the federal offenses that are 
not subject to a statute of limitations period). 
71 Powell, supra note 54, at 129; see also Barton, supra note 66, at 190 (“It is suggested that a 
conviction based upon older evidence might be less reliable and therefore less acceptable to the 
public than one based upon fresh evidence.”). 
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Limiting prosecutions to periods when we believe reliable evidence will 
remain available also promotes society’s interest in repose; an interest that 
courts have recognized is “fundamental to our system of criminal law.”72 
Repose reflects the judgment that, after a certain period of time, punishment 
may be less warranted and prosecution is not worth disrupting social 
healing.73 Providing for a limitations period “embodie[s] a moral judgment 
that if a person has lived blamelessly for a significant time, he should not have 
the anxiety of potential prosecution hanging over him forever.”74 When a 
person demonstrates self-rehabilitation through the omission of criminal 
activity for an extended period, society’s retributive and incapacitative 
interests in punishment are diminished.75 On the other hand, individuals who 
have committed crimes more recently pose a more immediate threat to 
society and there is no extended stretch of good behavior to compel the 
conclusion that they are rehabilitated. 
2. Efficiency and Predictability 
Second, criminal statutes of limitations “encourag[e] law enforcement 
officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.”76 This leads to the 
efficient conduct of investigations: by providing a limited period in which a 
crime may be charged, prosecutors are incentivized to vigilantly pursue 
 
72 See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[S]tatutes of limitations 
embody historically important rights of repose and fairness for defendants which are fundamental 
to our system of criminal law . . . .”); see also Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1953) 
(stating that the “long-standing congressional ‘policy of repose’ . . . is fundamental to our society 
and our criminal law.”). 
73 See Powell, supra note 54, at 130 (“Statutes of limitations are also made for the repose of 
society. The prosecution of old crimes perpetuates ill feeling and prevents social healing, and 
limitations periods are meant to impose an end-point after which prosecution cannot revive such 
sentiments.” (footnotes omitted) (quotations omitted)). 
74 Scott Turow, Still Guilty After All These Years, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/opinion/08turow.html [https://perma.cc/3L7B-YYRU]; see 
also The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 56, at 634 (“The pursuit of only more 
recent criminals is consistent with that aim of criminal law which seeks to rehabilitate wrongdoers 
and serves to free the citizen from vexatious fear of prosecution for old crimes.”). But see Kitai-
Sangero, supra note 65, at 433 (“Withdrawal from criminal conduct should not exempt one from 
liability for past crimes.”). 
75 Amy Dunn, Note, Criminal Law—Statutes of Limitation on Sexual Assault Crimes: Has the 
Availability of DNA Evidence Rendered Them Obsolete?, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 839, 845 
(2001) (“Another policy justification typically cited in favor of time limits on prosecuting crimes is 
the idea that the need for punishment wanes as time passes. Various legal scholars note that society’s 
instinct for retribution may, in some instances, fade . . . . Theoretically, those who have committed 
criminal acts in the past and have not since engaged in criminal behavior have ‘self-rehabilitated,’ 
making punishment long after their wrongs moot.” (footnotes omitted)). 
76 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). 
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suspected criminal activity soon after it happens.77 Requiring a prompt 
investigation also augments the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, which is triggered only after an indictment is returned against him,78 by 
forbidding the government from dragging its feet before bringing charges.79 In 
addition, the provision of a limitations period saves costs by “spar[ing] the 
courts from litigation of stale claims,”80 which would inevitably raise 
complicated evidentiary and burden of proof questions. Statutes of limitations 
also provide some assurance that prosecutors are incentivized to pursue the 
most significant or important allegations; creation of a limited window 
encourages prosecutors to litigate the most serious charges first, and significant 
“[d]elay suggests that the matter is not that important.”81 Finally, limitations 
periods further efficiency interests by “providing predictability about when 
causes of action will expire.”82 By providing a bright-line rule for when the 
government’s prosecutorial authority over a matter is exhausted, prosecutors 
and would-be defendants are spared from expending time and other resources 
that would otherwise be spent determining their rights and opportunities.83 
B. Equitable Tolling 
Being informed of the purposes underlying criminal statutes of 
limitations, I now evaluate whether the tolling of such statutes would be 
permitted to fill the potential loophole produced by the theorized existence 
of presidential immunity. 
It is settled law that federal courts have the judicial power to toll statutes 
of limitations when doing so is “consonant with the legislative scheme.”84 This 
power stems from the authority of the court to “fashion rules that are required 
 
77 See Kitai-Sangero, supra note 65, at 429 (“Statutes of limitations thus encourage law 
enforcement agencies to be efficient in investigating and prosecuting crimes.”); Powell, supra note 
55, at 130 (“Criminal limitations periods also further efficiency interests . . . . Without any limit on 
the period in which an indictment may issue, investigators and prosecutors would have less incentive 
to be diligent.”). 
78 See United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The constitutional right to a 
speedy trial is triggered when an indictment is returned against a defendant.”). 
79 See Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law, supra note 55, at 633 (“[A] statute of limitations is 
no assurance as to time of trial, since the finding of an indictment tolls the running of the statute 
but does not determine when trial will be held. It is at this point that the constitutional right to a 
speedy trial . . . supplements the aim of the limitation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
80 Powell, supra note 54, at 131. 
81 Barton, supra note 66, at 190. 
82 Powell, supra note 54, at 131; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) 
(“[Criminal limitations] statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is 
an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.”). 
83 Powell, supra note 54, at 131. 
84 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974). 
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for the protection of existing federal law.”85 In cases that involve “claims 
brought in federal court under federal statutes with their own limitations 
provisions,” there exists “federal judicial lawmaking power to fashion a tolling 
rule so long as it is (1) consistent with the statutory limitations provision and 
(2) implements either general equitable principles, against the background of 
which Congress is deemed to legislate, or the provisions of, or policies 
underlying, other federal law.”86 In this Section, I focus on rules that 
implement general equitable principles, and analyze whether a court could 
use its judicial power under this logic to craft a tolling rule that solves the 
statute of limitations problem this Comment addresses. Unlike the tolling 
rules discussed in Section II.C, equitable tolling rules are not employed to 
effectuate institutional interests, but to “modify a statutory time bar where 
its rigid application would create injustice.”87 And while judicial tolling rules 
akin to American Pipe tolling are concerned with producing proper policy 
outcomes that are consistent with the underlying legislative scheme,88 
equitable tolling rules are concerned with doing justice in individual cases, 
particularly in response to the behavior of one or more parties. In this 
Section, I analyze whether, under current precedent, equitable tolling could 
be invoked by a court to delay expiration of the statute of limitations for a 
crime committed by the President while he or she is immune from criminal 
prosecution. I begin by briefly introducing the concept of equitable tolling 
and considering whether it can theoretically be applied in a criminal case. I 
then discuss current precedent on equitable tolling and analyze how it may 
be applied in our hypothetical case against the President. Based on this 
analysis, I conclude that (1) equitable tolling is incompatible with the 
underlying purposes of criminal law statutes of limitations, and (2) even if 
equitable tolling could theoretically be applied, the existence of presidential 
immunity alone may not provide sufficient grounds for invoking the doctrine. 
1. Use of Equitable Tolling in Criminal Cases 
Equitable tolling is a doctrine that permits a court, through the use of its 
equitable powers, to extend the statute of limitations when, through 
extraordinary circumstances, a party is prevented from complying with the 
statutory deadline despite reasonable diligence throughout the period before 
the deadline passed.89 The purpose of the doctrine is to permit the extension 
 
85 Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Class Actions, Statutes of Limitations and 
Repose, and Federal Common Law, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2018). 
86 Id. at 38. 
87 Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2052 (2017). 
88 See infra Section II.C. 
89 Equitable Tolling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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of statutory deadlines in limited circumstances when a party is prevented 
from complying with them through no fault or lack of diligence of their 
own.90 Because it undermines the important interests served by statutes of 
limitations, equitable tolling is an “extraordinary remedy”91 invoked “only 
sparingly”92 in the “rare situation where [it] is demanded by sound legal 
principles as well as the interests of justice.”93 
While its place in civil cases is well defined, a review of the caselaw reveals 
no case to date in which a federal court has applied equitable tolling to a 
criminal statute of limitations. Indeed, “the term ‘equitable tolling’ comes up 
so rarely in the legal literature in connection to criminal prosecution, it 
appears to be something more imagined than real.”94 Furthermore, it seems 
that prosecutors have hardly even considered asking for such a remedy in 
response to a statute of limitations defense by a criminal defendant, likely 
because of their determination that it is unavailable. In this Section, I explain 
why equitable tolling does not comport with criminal law as a theoretical 
matter, contrary to the argument put forward in the 2000 OLC Memo. 
The 2000 OLC Memo, in arguing that equitable tolling may be allowed 
in a criminal case against the President, cited several cases to support its 
conclusion that equitable tolling could be implemented to solve the statute of 
limitations problem. One such case was United States v. Midgley.95 There, the 
defendant was initially charged in a six-count indictment with various drug 
and firearms offenses, before agreeing to plead guilty to one charge in 
exchange for the government dropping the rest.96 Several years later, while 
the defendant was doing time for this offense, the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Bailey v. United States97 mandated vacation of Midgley’s sentence, which he 
was granted pursuant to a habeas petition filed with the District Court.98 At 
the same time, the District Court denied the government’s request to 
reinstate the previously dismissed charges because the limitations period had 
expired.99 The government appealed, arguing that equitable considerations 
 
90 Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010). 
91 Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). 
92 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“[An] examination of cases in 
which we have applied the equitable tolling doctrine as between private litigants affords petitioner 
little help. Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly.”). 
93 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1996). 
94 Jed Shugerman, The Single Fatal Flaw in the Legal Argument Against Indicting a Sitting President, 
SLATE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/trump-indict-sitting-president-
statute-of-limitations.html. [https://perma.cc/M6EQ-JZDC]; see also Powell, supra note 55, at 121 
(“Equitable tolling rules have not traditionally been imported into the [criminal] statutory regime . . . .”). 
95 142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998). 
96 Id. at 175. 
97 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
98 Midgley, 142 F.3d at 175-76. 
99 Id. at 175. 
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demanded that the statute of limitations be tolled from the time of the 
original dismissal order.100 On review, the Third Circuit, quoting its prior 
decision in Powers v. Southland Corp.,101 stated that while equitable tolling is 
typically applied to limitations periods in civil actions, “‘there is no reason to 
distinguish between the rights protected by criminal and civil statutes of 
limitations.’”102 Notably, the Midgley court left out the final words of this 
quotation from Powers, a civil case, where the court said, “in this context.” In 
Powers, this “context” was the court’s decision as to whether a District Court’s 
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations was 
immediately reviewable on appeal.103 The Powers court went on to say that 
because they had previously decided that, in a criminal case, the rights 
protected by statutes of limitations are not irreparably lost absent immediate 
review, the same could be said of civil statutes of limitations and thus, the 
court did not have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion.104 This is a far different question from whether equitable 
tolling is applicable to a criminal statute of limitations in the same way as a 
civil one. Certainly, there is good reason to distinguish between the rights 
protected by criminal and civil statutes of limitations in that context. While 
the interests served by criminal statutes of limitations, as discussed above, are 
reflective of those furthered by civil statutes, adherence to their principles is 
much more important in the criminal context for several reasons. 
First, unlike civil litigation, which only involves an exchange of money, 
criminal prosecution involves the potential imposition of criminal sanctions 
against a defendant—including imprisonment or even death—the most 
serious action society can take against a person.105 Given that a defendant’s 
life and liberty, as opposed to monetary liability, is at stake in a criminal 
proceeding,106 there is a much stronger justification for strict adherence to 
rules, such as statutes of limitations, that protect defendants in the criminal 
 
100 Brief of Appellant at 24-28, United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-7402). 
101 4 F.3d 223(3d Cir. 1993). 
102 Midgley, 142 F.3d at 179 (quoting Powers, 4 F.3d at 233). 
103 Powers, 4 F.3d at 232. 
104 Id. at 233. 
105 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-11 (“To shed the blood of our fellow-
creature is a matter that requires the greatest deliberation and the fullest conviction of our own 
authority.”); L. Song Richardson, When Human Experimentation is Criminal, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 89, 108 (2009) (“In our society, the criminal sanction is viewed, uncontroversially, 
as the most serious statement of moral blameworthiness.”). 
106 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The accused during a criminal prosecution 
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his 
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction.”). 
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versus the civil context.107 Further, “because of the seriousness of criminal 
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define 
criminal activity.”108 Crafting a criminal limitations period involves an 
important balancing of interests between criminal defendants, victims, and 
society as a whole—a policy judgment that is much better suited to the 
legislature than the courts.109 While the creation of a limitations period that 
binds the government leaves open the possibility that some wrongdoers will 
benefit from it, Congress has already considered this cost and determined 
that it is outweighed by the interests that the statute of limitations seeks to 
protect. Courts should not be free to upend this determination through the 
use of equitable tolling in criminal proceedings on an ad hoc basis. 
Second, the high stakes of criminal proceedings demand predictability for 
defendants, which favors the use of bright-line rules over pliable standards 
based on an individual court’s weighing of equitable considerations.110 
Because of this, the Supreme Court has demanded that Congress be specific 
in defining crimes, in order to provide a clear signal to society about what 
conduct is criminal and what is not.111 The same mandate is logically 
applicable to statutes that define the rights of defendants in criminal 
proceedings. Defendants should be given a fair warning not only about what 
conduct is criminal, but also about when and how they can be prosecuted for 
it. The general federal criminal statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C § 3282, fulfills 
this requirement by providing a clear rule for when and how a criminal 
proceeding must be initiated by the government, and it allows for no express 
exceptions. Courts should not impair the necessary predictability that this 
 
107 See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) (“Another reason for treating civil 
and criminal cases differently is that the ‘stakes are higher’ in criminal cases, where liberty or even 
life may be at stake, and where the government’s ‘sole interest is to convict.’”). 
108 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
109 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“[C]ourts do not substitute their 
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 69 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Whether or not this be wise 
legislation it is not the province of the court to inquire. Under our systems of government the courts 
are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation.”). 
110 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *2-3 (“[Criminal law] should be founded on principles 
that are permanent, uniform, and universal.”). 
111 The Court stated,  
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before 
he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world 
in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if 
a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be 
clear. 
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). 
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rule provides by inferring exceptions to it that Congress did not intend, even 
if good policy reasons exist for doing so.112 
Third, criminal law is not an area of the law where “equity finds a 
comfortable home.”113 Unlike civil litigation, which typically involves the 
enforcement of common-law doctrines such as negligence, fraud, and breach 
of contract, criminal law is fundamentally statutory.114 “That all federal 
criminal law derives from statutes is a cornerstone of the federal criminal 
jurisprudence,” and common law crimes “run afoul of our deepest notions of 
due process and raise the specter of the judiciary imposing its will . . . against 
its citizens.”115 The codification movement in criminal law reflects the 
collective judgment of our society that “legislators rather than judges should 
create and define criminal offenses.”116 Thus, the task of a court adjudicating 
a criminal matter is to interpret and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature in adopting the substantive criminal law and the statutes that 
govern its procedure.117 This stands in contrast to civil litigation, where courts 
are often charged with defining the substantive and procedural rights of the 
parties. This difference in the judicial role in the civil and criminal context 
demonstrates why equitable tolling is more amenable to the former than the 
latter.118 While the civil procedure often gives judges wide latitude to 
ascertain the truth over ensuring the protection of either party, criminal 
procedure’s primary goal is to establish adversarial protections that safeguard 
the accused.119 The use of equitable tolling, while consistent with the former 
proposition, is wholly inconsistent with the latter. Though tolling in the civil 
 
112 See United States v. Peloquin, 810 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that courts should 
not infer exceptions to the explicit language of 18 U.S.C. § 3282, regardless of the policy reasons 
that may justify a departure). 
113 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647 (2010). 
114 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of 
a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are 
solely creatures of statute.” (emphasis added)). 
115 Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193, 194 (2002). 
116 Kevin C. McMunigal, A Statutory Approach to Common Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285, 1285 
(2004). As Professor McMunigal notes, this movement started after the Supreme Court abolished 
the use of federal common law crimes over 200 years ago. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a 
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”); accord United 
States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416-17 (1816). 
117 See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion, and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent 
Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) (noting how courts are charged 
with interpreting the legislature’s intent with respect to a criminal law). 
118 See Powell, supra note 54, at 121 (“The general absence of equitable principles from the 
federal criminal limitations regime likely results from the fact that criminal limitations periods did 
not exist at common law but rather evolved through legislative enactments and adjustments.”). 
119 See Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1985). 
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context may be appropriate to determine the truth of the matter against a 
party’s interest, invoking equitable tolling to extend the time for prosecution 
upsets the adversarial protections that safeguard the accused: specifically, the 
safeguard against requiring the defendant to prepare a defense using stale 
evidence.120 For the foregoing reasons, there is good reason to distinguish 
between the rights protected by civil and criminal statutes of limitations. 
Although the court in Midgley went on to apply an equitable tolling 
analysis akin to one that would prevail in a civil case, it expressed trepidation 
about its ability to do so: 
Section 3282 establishes a fixed limitation period with no exception. However 
tempting it may be to create equitable exceptions to bright line rules, we must 
concur with Chief Judge Rambo’s observation in Gaither that “the very 
existence of a statute of limitations entails the prospect that wrongdoers will 
benefit,” and that this reason alone cannot serve as the basis for an exception 
to the statute. Ultimately, the clear and unambiguous rule afforded by the 
criminal statute of limitations is preferable to a shifting standard based on 
the perceived equity of the defendant’s conduct. While Congress and the 
courts may continue to weigh competing policy interests concerning the 
administration of justice, the unqualified limitation period of § 3282 reflects 
a balance that has already been struck.121 
The court here correctly identifies some of the problems, inherent in 
attempting to apply equitable principles to a criminal statute of limitations, 
that I addressed above. The general federal limitations statute (18 U.S.C. 
§ 3282) is firm in its mandate, provides no exceptions, and already reflects a 
policy judgment by Congress that the government’s right to initiate a 
prosecution against a defendant should be cut off after a certain point to 
protect the important interests the limitations period furthers. While the 
court in Midgley did apply an equitable tolling analysis to § 3282, it may have 
merely conceded its applicability given the disposition would have been the 
same either way. This is demonstrated by the fact that the court initially 
provided no color on its seemingly novel decision to move forward with the 
equitable tolling inquiry for a criminal statute, while later providing 
compelling reasons for why the decision to do so was potentially unwarranted 
in the first instance. 
Another court facing the same scenario as the Midgley court declined the 
opportunity to apply equitable tolling to the criminal limitations statute. In 
United States v. Podde, the district court granted the government’s motion to 
reinstate time-barred charges when, as in Midgley, a favorable Supreme Court 
 
120 See United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 175-79 (3d Cir. 1998). 
121 Id. at 180. 
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ruling required reversal of a conviction the defendant previously pled guilty 
to.122 The defendant was convicted of the reinstated charges, but the Second 
Circuit reversed on appeal, refusing to permit any equitable considerations 
to toll the period prescribed by § 3282.123 The court first reasoned that the 
criminal statute of limitations served a critical purpose in guarding against 
the “danger of erosion of defenses over time,” which required it to be liberally 
interpreted in the defendant’s favor.124 It went on to hold that neither (1) the 
good faith and diligence of the government nor (2) the defendant’s breach of 
the plea agreement provided an adequate basis to amend the statute, saying: 
[The] law provides, in no uncertain terms, that “no person shall be 
prosecuted . . . for any offense . . . unless the indictment is found . . . within 
five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” Even if the 
parties’ promises to each other were negated, the fact remains that the 
indictment was reinstated more than eight years after the events in 
question.125 
Here, Judge Calabresi correctly reasoned that the policy judgment 
embedded in the statute should not be overridden by a court’s consideration 
of the equities. Because of the important purposes that the statute serves, a 
literal interpretation and application are necessary. 
While Third Circuit cases subsequent to Midgley have not foreclosed the 
potential applicability of equitable tolling in a criminal case,126 and federal 
prosecutors in that circuit have argued for it on occasion,127 no other circuits 
have intimated at the possibility. The lack of application of the doctrine over 
the course of history itself provides strong evidence of its (un)availability, 
and its omission from criminal law can be justified on both theoretical and 
practical grounds. As I discussed above, there are many reasons for 
distinguishing between civil and criminal law with respect to the application 
of equitable tolling: criminal cases involve higher stakes and require 
heightened protection for defendants, the potential implication of criminal 
sanctions demands assurance of predictability by adhering to bright-line rules 
rather than standards, and criminal law is not generally amenable to the 
import of equitable principles. Furthermore, the express and plain language 
 
122 105 F.3d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1997). 
123 Id. at 820. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 821 (citation omitted). 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 367 (3d Cir. 2005) (performing an equitable 
tolling analysis). 
127 See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 59-60, United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(No. 06-3190) (arguing for application of equitable tolling); Brief of Appellant at 14-16, United 
States v. Gilchrist, 215 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3052) (same). 
2020] Tolling in a Presidential Prosecution 1815 
of the statute (§ 3282) and the need to interpret it in a way that is faithful to 
the important interests it serves foreclose courts’ ability to invoke equitable 
tolling to circumvent its mandate. For these reasons, equitably tolling has no 
place in criminal law in the first instance.128 
2. Application of the Civil Equitable Tolling Framework to the Criminal 
Limitations Statute 
Even assuming equitable tolling could theoretically be applied in a 
criminal case, it is not clear that, under current precedent, the President’s 
temporary immunity from prosecution would itself be enough to successfully 
invoke the doctrine. Determining whether a party is entitled to equitable 
tolling of a statute of limitations involves a two-part inquiry. First, the party 
must establish that the limitations statute at issue is subject to equitable 
tolling. If so, the party must then show that (1) it has been pursuing its rights 
diligently throughout the limitations period and (2) some extraordinary 
circumstance prevented timely filing of its case.129 
a. Is § 3282 Subject to Equitable Tolling? 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida130 provides a useful 
framework for determining whether a statute of limitations is subject to 
equitable tolling. There, the court was charged with deciding whether the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) statutory 
limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons.131 First, the court 
noted, citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs132, that federal limitations 
statutes are normally afforded a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable 
tolling.133 And in the case of AEDPA, this presumption was strengthened by 
 
128 The other case cited by the 2000 OLC Memo as support for equitable tolling in a criminal 
case was United States v. Levine. 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 256. In Levine, the court was 
charged with deciding whether the pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations 
grounds is immediately appealable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. 
United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1981). The court declared that statutes of 
limitations are generally subject to “tolling, suspension, and waiver.” Id. at 120. However, a footnote 
referenced to “tolling” included only citations to cases for which sealed indictments were held to 
have “tolled” the statute of limitations when they were sealed, not cases supporting the use of 
equitable tolling. For further discussion of this issue, see infra Section II.A. In addition, other 
mentions by the court of “tolling” referred to certain forms of statutory, rather than equitable, 
tolling. Id. at 120-21. Thus, this case fails to provide any support for the proposition that equitable 
tolling should or could be available to toll a criminal statute of limitations. 
129 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
130 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 
131 Id. at 645. 
132 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
133 Holland, 560 U.S. at 645-46. 
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the fact that equitable principles have traditionally governed the substantive 
law of habeas corpus.134 Second, the court analyzed whether equitable tolling 
would be inconsistent with the text and structure of the statute. Textually, the 
court found that AEDPA’s statute of limitations did not contain language that 
was “unusually emphatic,” nor did it reiterate its time limitation.135 
Structurally, the fact that the statute expressly enumerated exceptions to its 
basic time limits did not foreclose the potential use of equitable tolling.136 
Third, the court asked whether equitable tolling would undermine AEDPA’s 
basic purposes.137 Here, the court reasoned that while the purpose of AEDPA 
was to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process, it did not seek 
to end every possible delay at all costs.138 Furthermore, the statute was 
adopted with the knowledge that habeas petitions play a vital role in 
protecting constitutional rights, and thus, the court should be hesitant to 
conclude that Congress’s omission of express reference to equitable tolling 
indicated an intent to “close courthouse doors that a strong equitable claim 
would ordinarily keep open.”139 Because each of these factors weighed in favor 
of permitting equitable tolling, the court held that the AEDPA was amenable 
to equitable tolling in the first instance.140 
i. Presumption in Favor of Equitable Tolling 
Applying this same framework to the federal criminal statute of 
limitations, § 3282, dictates a different result. First, while the Court approved 
a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling for federal statutes of 
limitations, Irwin specifically limited this mandate to civil statutes. As the 
Court noted there, this presumption was considered only in the context of 
“lawsuits between private litigants.”141 Moreover, as noted in Section II.B 
above, criminal law is not an area of the law that has traditionally been 
governed by equitable principles.142 For the large part of this country’s 
history, criminal law has for good reason been dictated by statute, and 
criminal proceedings do not typically import equitable doctrines or 
principles. The high stakes of criminal proceedings demand predictability 
and the maintenance of adversarial protections to safeguard defendants, 
which militates against the use of equitable doctrines. Again, criminal law is 
 
134 Id. at 646. 
135 Id. at 647. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 648. 
138 Id. at 649. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) . 
142 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
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not an area of the law where equity “finds a comfortable home.”143 Finally, the 
Court in Holland also felt use of a rebuttable presumption was proper because 
AEDPA was enacted after its adoption in Irwin. Thus, Congress was likely 
aware that a presumption in favor of equitable tolling would apply to any new 
statute of limitations absent an express mandate otherwise.144 The same 
cannot be said of § 3282, which was adopted well before the Court’s decision 
in Irwin. For these reasons, a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable 
tolling should not prevail with respect to § 3282. 
ii. Textual and Structural Considerations 
The text and structure of § 3282 also militate against the use of equitable 
tolling to extend the prescribed limitations period. In United States v. 
Brockamp the Court held that the statutory limitations period on tax refund 
claims could not be equitably tolled.145 The Court found that Irwin’s 
presumption had been overcome, in part, because the statute at issue, 42 
U.S.C. § 6511(a), “set[] forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic 
form.”146 The same can be said of § 3282, which states that the limitations 
period provided should be adhered to “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided 
by law.”147 This contrasts with the AEDPA statute at issue in Holland, 
provides a much stronger mandate than that expressed in § 6511, and 
conclusively forecloses the existence of any implied equitable tolling 
exception. The Court in Brockamp also considered the general subject matter 
of the statute at issue, and reasoned that the administrative problems that 
would result through the creation of an equitable tolling exception weighed 
against reading it into the statute, saying these problems “tell[] us that 
Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where 
and when, to expand the statute’s limitations periods, rather than delegate to 
the courts a generalized power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity 
so requires.”148 This same rationale applies with more force to criminal cases 
implicating § 3282. If prosecutors were given free rein to argue for equitable 
tolling whenever a case was otherwise time barred, one can expect they would 
use it whenever a defendant was otherwise “saved by the bell.” This would 
require criminal defendants to litigate “large numbers of late claims, 
accompanied by requests for ‘equitable tolling’ which, upon close inspection, 
 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (finding Irwin’s presumption 
should not apply to the limitations period on tax refund claims in part because tax law “is not 
normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities”). 
144 Holland, 560 U.S. at 646. 
145 Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 348. 
146 Id. at 350. 
147 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2018) (emphasis added). 
148 Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 353. 
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might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification.”149 Thus, an implied 
equitable tolling exception is inconsistent with both the text and structure of 
§ 3282. 
iii. Underlying Purpose 
Finally, an implied equitable tolling exception would be inconsistent with 
the underlying purposes of § 3282. In United States v. Beggerly, the Court 
decided whether equitable tolling is available in a suit brought under the 
Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), which provides a 12-year limitations period to file 
a quiet title action against the United States, beginning at the time the 
plaintiff knows or should know of the government’s claim to the property.150 
The Court held the QTA was not amenable to equitable tolling in part 
because “[i]t is of special importance that landowners know with certainty 
what their rights are, and the period during which those rights may be subject 
to challenge.”151 Again, this same reasoning applies with more force to 
criminal cases implicating § 3282. Certainly it is of “special importance” that 
criminal defendants know with certainty what their rights are, and the period 
during which those rights may be subject to challenge. The rights at stake for 
a criminal defendant—potentially the accused’s very life and liberty—are 
much more serious than the rights at stake for the government in a quiet title 
action. If the force of the government’s right to repose from a quiet title action 
demands the rejection of equitable tolling under the QTA, as the Court 
decided in Beggerly, it is fair to conclude that a defendant’s right to repose 
from a criminal prosecution demands the rejection of equitable tolling under 
§ 3282. Furthermore, the Court in Holland found equitable tolling consistent 
with AEDPA’s purpose because the statute was enacted against the backdrop 
of a history of common law that approved the use of equitable principles in 
habeas cases. The same cannot be said of § 3282, which was enacted against 
the backdrop of a history of statutory superiority in criminal law, wherein the 
import of equitable principles was largely rejected. Based on the foregoing 
analysis, a court called to determine whether equitable tolling is available 
under § 3282 should find that it is not. 
b. Would the President’s Temporary Immunity Constitute An “Extraordinary 
Circumstance”? 
Even if equitable tolling could be applied to § 3282, it is not clear that the 
President’s temporary immunity from criminal process would itself be 
 
149 Id. at 352. 
150 524 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (2018). 
151 Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 49. 
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enough for the prosecution to successfully invoke the doctrine against him or 
her at trial. Once a party successfully demonstrates that the limitations 
statute it faces is subject to equitable tolling, it then must show that (1) it has 
been pursuing its rights diligently throughout the limitations period, and (2) 
some extraordinary circumstance stood in its way and prevented timely 
filing.152 As an initial matter, I assume that prosecutors diligently pursued any 
case sought against the President, and were only blocked from indicting him 
or her because of the current Department of Justice policy against indicting 
a sitting President.153 Thus, the question that needs to be addressed is whether 
the President’s temporary immunity constitutes an “extraordinary 
circumstance” that would entitle prosecutors to equitable tolling in a case 
against him or her. To be sure, the hypothetical case I posit here would be in 
one sense extraordinary. It would involve the indictment of a President 
immediately when he or she leaves office after the abeyance of prosecution 
for some extended period because of an agency policy against presidential 
indictment. Certainly no court has faced such a situation before, and no 
prosecutor has been estopped from indicting a public official because the 
Constitution grants him or her temporary immunity. In this sense, there are 
rather extraordinary circumstances at play that prevent prosecutors from 
complying with the statutory deadline. However, the question is how this 
situation fits into the legal definition of “extraordinary circumstance” within 
the context of equitable tolling. A review of the caselaw on this doctrine 
reveals that presidential immunity would unlikely be considered an 
“extraordinary circumstance” automatically. 
Consistent with the tradition that “flexibility is a hallmark of equity 
jurisdiction,”154 courts invoking equitable tolling have relied on a variety of 
circumstances to justify its use, including the abandonment of a party’s 
 
152 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 
(2d Cir. 2000) (“The burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of equitable tolling . . . lies with 
the [party who seeks it].”). 
153 But note that a defendant President could argue that the DOJ’s failure to prosecute because 
of its own policy against Presidential prosecution was a lack of diligence. I consider this argument 
in my analysis of the extraordinary circumstance prong of the equitable tolling analysis below. See 
infra notes 193–95 and accompanying text. 
154 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see 
also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the 
power . . . to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.”); Rosario-Torres v. 
Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 321 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[T]he hallmark of equity is the ability to assess 
all relevant facts and circumstances and tailor appropriate relief on a case by case basis.”). 
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attorney,155 some error on the part of the court156 or court personnel,157 or 
misconduct by the opposing party.158 Despite their differences, these 
circumstances reveal a common thread. In each case, the plaintiff was granted 
equitable tolling relief because of some wrongful or erroneous conduct by his 
or her adversary or a third party. As one court stated, an extraordinary 
circumstance is something that “derives from some ‘external obstacle to 
timely filing . . . beyond [the plaintiff ’s] control,’ not from self-inflicted 
delay.”159 This concept is important when considering our hypothetical case 
against the President after he or she leaves office as, in some sense, the 
circumstances causing delay are self-inflicted by the prosecutorial body. To 
the extent that federal prosecutors are forbidden from indicting the President 
because of a standing DOJ policy against such a practice, the President could 
credibly claim that the Department’s failure to indict him was self-inflicted. 
After all, the policy was established years ago and was not adopted by the 
President’s administration; he or she did not ask for it,160 immunity will have 
 
155 See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 289 (2012) (excusing “the procedural default into 
which the [petioner] was trapped when counsel of record abandoned him without a word of warning”); 
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650-52 (2010) (explaining that attorney misconduct can warrant 
equitable tolling if it is more than “garden variety” or “excusable neglect”); Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 
358, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that “affirmatively and knowingly misleading [a client] by promising 
him that he would file the petition” before the deadline can trigger equitable tolling). 
156 See, e.g., Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding an extraordinary 
circumstance when the state court failed to send the plaintiff notice of a decision within a reasonable 
time after entry of the order); Urcinoli v. Cathel, 546 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding an 
extraordinary circumstance when the district court failed to provide habeas petitioner the option of 
deleting unexhausted claims rather than returning with those claims to state court); Spottsville v. 
Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding an extraordinary circumstance when the court 
provided misleading instructions to habeas petitioner on how to file his appeal); Corjasso v. Ayers, 
278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding an extraordinary circumstance when the district court 
improperly dismissed the plaintiff ’s charges). 
157 See, e.g., Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding an extraordinary 
circumstance when the clerk of the court failed to timely notify plaintiff of the court’s decision); Sanchez 
v. Frauenheim, No. 18-04203, 2019 WL 399719, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2019) (finding an extraordinary 
circumstance when the Clerk of the Court improperly rejected a manual filing by the plaintiff). 
158 See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1991) (noting equitable tolling 
may be available when “the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct 
into allowing the filing deadline to pass”); In re Milby, 875 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding 
an extraordinary circumstance when the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding made false statements 
on his petition and at creditors’ meetings, and failed to turn over documents and cooperate with the 
trustee); Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1353-55 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t]he extraordinary 
circumstances standard . . . may be met ‘where the defendant misleads the plaintiff ’” such as through 
fraud, misinformation, or deliberate concealment). 
159 Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., 700 F. App’x 317, 320 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 756 (2016)). 
160 The counterargument here would be that the President either knew or should have known that 
the DOJ maintained a policy of not indicting a sitting President, and therefore the President was on notice, 
even before being elected, that he or she could be spared from criminal process while in office. 
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been invoked for him by the Attorney General.161 Moreover, the existence of 
the policy, which is the supposed roadblock to bringing charges, is well within 
prosecutors’ control—presumably, the Department is free to change its policy 
on presidential indictability at any time. This is especially true given that 
presidential immunity is not a matter of settled precedent.162 When viewed 
this way, the circumstance that prevented timely filing was not all that 
extraordinary. While prosecutors may have a legitimate reason for choosing 
not to indict the President, “more than a showing of good cause is required” 
to demonstrate a circumstance justifies the use of equitable tolling.163 
Therefore, even assuming that equitable tolling (1) can theoretically be used 
in a criminal case, and (2) would be applicable to the federal criminal statute 
of limitations, it is not clear that an analysis of the issue under current 
precedent would yield a favorable result for prosecutors in a case against the 
(former) President. 
C. Tolling to Implement the Policies and Procedures of Other Federal Law 
In addition to equitable considerations, courts can adopt tolling rules to 
implement “the provisions of, or policies underlying, other federal law,” so 
long as tolling is consistent with the statutory limitations provision at issue.164 
In this Section, I discuss instances where courts have adopted tolling rules for 
these reasons, and analyze whether a court could use its judicial power under 
this logic to craft a tolling rule that solves the statute of limtations problem 
this Comment addresses. 
1. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah 
The judicial power to adopt tolling rules to implement the policies and 
procedures of other federal law was most notably demonstrated in American 
Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, an antitrust class action case brought under the 
Clayton Act.165 There, the Court faced the question of whether members of a 
putative class could intervene after class certification was denied when the 
statute of limitations period had expired.166 Here, the statute of limitation 
 
161 Shugerman, supra note 94. 
162 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. This argument is largely focused on federal 
prosecution but could also apply to a delayed state prosecution to the extent that state prosecutors 
chose to follow the DOJ policy against indicting a sitting President. In addition, if a state prosecutor 
forewent indictment merely to avoid having to confront the constitutional question regarding 
presidential indictability, the President may have an argument for a lack of diligence under the first 
prong of the equitable tolling analysis. 
163 Collier-Fluellen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 408 F. App’x 330, 330 (11th Cir. 2011). 
164 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 85, at 38. 
165 414 U.S. 538, 541 (1974). 
166 Id. 
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confronted was § 48 of the Clayton Act, and the policies intimating the 
potential need for a tolling rule were those embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, namely the interest of federal courts in the economy 
and efficiency of class litigation. 
In the first part of its opinion, the American Pipe Court recounted the 
history of Rule 23, and explained that “[a] federal class action is no longer an 
‘invitation to joinder’ but a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather 
than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.”167 The 
Court went on to hold that: 
[T]he claimed members of the class stood as parties to the suit until and 
unless they received notice thereof and chose not to continue. Thus, the 
commencement of the action satisfied the purpose of the limitation provision 
as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit as well as for 
the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the principal 
function of a class suit . . . . [encouraging] precisely the multiplicity of 
activity which Rule 23 was designed to avoid . . . .168 
Here, the court justified its adoption of a tolling rule for putative class 
members by pointing to the policies of Rule 23, specifically its function to 
eliminate the unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions. The Court 
continued this logic in the next section of its opinion, noting that “[a] contrary 
rule allowing participation only by those potential members of the class who 
had earlier filed motions to intervene in the suit would deprive Rule 23 class 
actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose 
of the procedure.”169 Again, the Court here noted that failure to adopt a tolling 
rule to allow participation by putative class members who were otherwise time-
barred would undercut the important policies furthered by Rule 23. 
Having explained the federal law interests in favor of adopting a novel 
tolling rule, the Court then addressed whether such a rule was consistent with 
the statutory limitations provision at issue. On this point, the Court concluded 
that the class action-tolling rule it adopted was consistent with the policies that 
inform limitations law.170 While it left open the ability of future courts to “deny 
tolling where limitations policies would be subverted,” the Court found that such 
policies were supported in American Pipe because the named plaintiff notified 
the defendant of its substantive claims and the number and generic identities of 
the potential plaintiffs. The defendant had “the essential information necessary 
to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation,” thus 
 
167 Id. at 550. 
168 Id. at 551. 
169 Id. at 553. 
170 Id. at 554; Burbank & Wolff, supra note 85, at 12. 
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satisfying “[t]he policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of 
barring a plaintiff who ‘has slept on his rights.’”171 
2. Implementing the Policies and Procedures of Other Federal Law 
In the balance of this Section, I apply the framework outlined above from 
American Pipe to the hypothetical case against a former President to 
determine whether a court could, in a similar fashion, adopt a novel tolling 
rule to solve the statute of limitations problem addressed herein. In the 
hypothetical case, the limitations provision at issue would be § 3282 (or a 
similar criminal statute of limitations provision from Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code), and the provisions and policies sought to be implemented would be 
those embodied in Article II of the Constitution, and federal courts’ interest 
in upholding the rule of law. 
a. Article II 
First, a court could adopt a tolling rule to solve the statute of limitations 
problem as a means for implementing the policies embodied in Article II of 
the Constitution, specifically those that demand presidential immunity from 
criminal process. Certainly these constitutional interests would form a strong 
basis for a novel tolling rule when compared to the litigation efficiency 
interests that produced American Pipe tolling, as constitutional interpretation 
is the Supreme Court’s “central and most important function.”172 
As discussed in Section I.B, there are strong policies emanating from 
Article II that arguably demand the President be immune from criminal 
process while he or she is in office, namely: (1) criminal prosecution is not an 
adequately accountable process for removing a sitting President;173 (2) the 
President “occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast 
and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided 
time and attention to his public duties;”174 rather than a defense against 
criminal charges;175 and (3) permitting criminal prosecution of the President 
could lead to frivolous and politically motivated charges from federal and 
state prosecutors.176 In the same way that the American Pipe court held that 
the provisions of Rule 23 required judicial tolling for putative class members 
 
171 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55. 
172 Daniel O. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an 
Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 41 (1995); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 
(1803) (stating that courts should not “close their eyes [to] the constitution, and see only the law”). 
173 See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
174 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 (1997). 
175 Id. 
176 See Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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to preserve the litigation efficiency mechanisms embodied therein, a court 
could find that these practical considerations necessarily flow from the 
provisions of Article II that grant the President the “executive Power”177 and 
require him or her to “faithfully execute the Office” and “preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution.”178 In order for the President to properly wield 
the executive power, faithfully execute the office, and uphold the 
Constitution, he or she must be free of the substantial practical difficulties 
created by potential criminal process against the Executive.179 And further, 
assuming that this immunity exists, a court could adopt a tolling rule that 
solves the statute of limitations problem in order to properly effectuate the 
doctrine and maintain its consistency with other important principles, such 
as our courts’ interest in upholding and enforcing the rule of law. Closing the 
proverbial loophole created by the intersection of criminal presidential 
immunity and limitations law through a tolling rule may be a proper way for 
a court to implement this important doctrine. 
Viewed another way, a tolling rule would be a way for a court to properly 
set the bounds of criminal presidential immunity, as the Supreme Court has 
done through its holdings in other immunity contexts. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
the Supreme Court held that the President “is entitled to absolute immunity 
from damages liability predicated on his official acts.”180 As with those that 
support immunity from criminal process, the arguments relied on by the 
Court in this holding were not grounded in textual considerations, but in the 
policies establishing “the President’s unique office, rooted in the 
constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our 
history.”181 President Clinton later sought to extend the Executive’s civil 
immunity to postpone civil actions against the President related to liability 
for unofficial acts.182 However, the Supreme Court declined to sanction this 
extension, finding that the interests that dictated the holding in Fitzgerald—
chiefly, the President’s inability to act freely in his official decisionmaking—
provided no support for a claim of immunity based on unofficial conduct.183 
Adopting a tolling rule to solve the statute of limitations problem addressed 
 
177 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
178 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take 
the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute 
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.’”). 
179 Alternatively, a court could, if convinced, rely on the textual arguments for presidential 
immunity grounded in the Impeachment Judgment Clause. See supra Section I.A. 
180 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). 
181 Id. 
182 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997). 
183 Id. at 693-94. 
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here could likewise be a way for a court to set the boundaries of criminal 
presidential immunity. Here, a court could find that while presidential 
immunity should obtain for the reasons outlined in Section II.B, it should 
not functionally extend past a president’s term by allowing him or her to 
escape prosecution through a subsequent statute of limitations defense. A 
tolling rule eliminating this possibility could ensure that the practical 
consequences of presidential immunity do not extend the protection past its 
point of legal justification, just as a grant of temporary immunity from civil 
actions based on unofficial conduct would have done for President Clinton. 
b. The Rule of Law 
Second, a court could justify a new tolling rule as a means for upholding 
the rule of law, a responsibility commonly self-attributed to federal courts.184 
While these interests, in addition to those outlined in Section II.B, have 
never served as the basis for adoption of a judicial tolling rule, they again 
would seem to weigh much heavier in a court’s decisionmaking than the 
litigation efficiency interests that produced American Pipe tolling. 
Although the “rule of law” is a doctrine often cited by courts, its precise 
definition is unclear.185 Courts and commentators “view it as anything from a 
set of formal-procedural requirements, such as generality, clarity, and 
stability, to a more substantive set of values . . . such as autonomy, fairness, 
liberty, dignity, and democracy.”186 Most commonly, the doctrine refers to the 
belief “that every person is subject to the ordinary law within the 
jurisdiction;”187 that is, no person is “above the law.”188 The courts’ 
commitment to ensuring outcomes consistent with this principle is what gives 
the people under their jurisdiction confidence in their rulings.189 
The hypothetical case against a former President charged with criminal 
conduct certainly raises strong rule of law considerations to the extent the 
 
184 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 686 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Supreme Court has a “duty to uphold” the “Rule of Law”); Adam Shinar, Enabling Resistance: 
How Courts Facilitate Departures from the Law, and Why This May Not Be a Bad Thing, 17 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 989, 996 (2014) (“It is the [Supreme] Court that is entrusted with maintaining 
America’s commitment to the rule of law . . . .”). 
185 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (“The Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historical ideal, the precise meaning of 
which may be less clear today than ever before.”). 
186 Shinar, supra note 184, at 1045. 
187 Rule of Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
188 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 (1989) 
(“The ideal of ‘the rule of law, not of men,’ calls upon us to strive to ensure that our law itself will 
rule (govern) us, not the wishes of powerful individuals.”). 
189 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (stating that a 
holding consistent with the rule of law was needed to prevent “unnecessary damage to the Court’s 
legitimacy”). 
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President attempts to evade prosecution for a criminal offense through the 
dual benefit of presidential immunity and the statute of limitations. If a 
President were to successfully avoid criminal punishment merely by 
ascension to the office, this outcome would directly contradict the concept of 
“law as king.” Indeed, it would effectively place the President “above the law,” 
given the right set of circumstances. In this case, the courts’ mandate to 
uphold the rule of law by ensuring its universal and consistent application 
would certainly form a strong basis for invoking judicial tolling. 
3. Consistency with Criminal Statutes of Limitations 
As the prior two Sections make clear, a court would have strong federal 
law interests to rely on in dictating the need for a new tolling rule that solves 
the statute of limitations problem I address here. However, in order for a 
court to employ such a remedy, in addition to identifying policies of other 
federal law that are implemented through tolling, it also must find that tolling 
is consistent with the statutory limitations provision at issue; here, the 
criminal statutes of limitations of Title 18. The below analysis demonstrates 
that, with respect to this question, there are similarly strong reasons for 
denying a tolling remedy. 
In American Pipe, the Supreme Court held that the new tolling rule it 
dictated there was consistent with the limitations provision of the Clayton 
Act because it did not relieve plaintiffs of the need to notify defendants of 
the subject matter of their suit and the number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs.190 Moreover, it was consistent with “[t]he policies of 
ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of barring a plaintiff who ‘has 
slept on his rights.’”191 While criminal limitations statutes likewise embody 
interests in notice and fairness, the need for courts to protect these interests 
by adhering to the specified limitations period is much stronger in criminal 
cases. On this point, much of the discussion in subsection II.B.1 bears 
repeating. Summarizing here, criminal statutes of limitations should be more 
strictly adhered to than their civil counterparts because (1) criminal 
prosecutions import higher stakes for defendants,192 (2) criminal law must 
more clearly define what actions are criminal and when and how they can be 
prosecuted,193 and (3) the history of statutory superiority in criminal law 
suggests courts should be more wary of modifying procedural protections in 
the criminal, versus the civil, context.194 In addition, criminal statutes of 
 
190 Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974). 
191 Id. at 554. 
192 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
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limitations serve interests separate from those embodied in civil limitations 
statutes that are likewise inconsistent with judicial tolling. Among them, 
society’s justification for punishing criminal offenders195 and its interest in 
the proper allocation of scarce prosecutorial resources. Given the interests at 
stake, criminal statutes of limitations should be viewed more akin to a statute 
of repose, which the Supreme Court has stated “may not be tolled, even in 
cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff ’s control.”196 
Besides conflicting with the general policies of criminal statutes of 
limitations, judicial tolling is also inconsistent with the text and structure of 
§ 3282. Much of the analysis above concluding that § 3282 should not be 
tolled for equitable reasons also applies here. As discussed in Section II.C., 
§ 3282 “sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form,”197 stating 
that the prescribed period should be adhered to “[e]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided by law.”198 The use of specific language in the statute 
makes sense, as Congress has been directed by the Supreme Court to carefully 
define what actions are criminal and how and when they can be prosecuted.199 
The firm language of § 3282 further suggests that Congress has already made 
clear the circumstances that should allow for suspension or extension of the 
limitations period,200 and courts should not be free to add to the list on an ad 
hoc basis. In addition, the litany of different limitations periods enumerated 
in Title 18 demonstrates that Congress has already performed a careful 
analysis of the appropriate limitations period for each offense in the criminal 
code,201 likely considering the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s 
ability to preserve exculpatory evidence, and this legislative balancing should 
not be upset through judicial tolling. Finally, permitting judicial tolling in 
one instance may open the door for prosecutors to seek its application in a 
host of other circumstances where they believe a criminal defendant has 
benefited from the limitations period to escape prosecution, a prospect that 
would upend the careful balance struck by Congress in crafting the criminal 
limitations periods in Title 18. 
*      *      * 
 
195 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
196 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014). 
197 United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997). 
198 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2018). 
199 See supra subsection II.C.2. 
200 See DOYLE, supra note 70, at 3-4 (“[A]n otherwise applicable limitation period may be 
suspended or extended in cases involving child abuse, the concealment of the assets of an estate in 
bankruptcy, wartime fraud against the government, dismissal of original charges, fugitives, foreign 
evidence, or DNA evidence.”). 
201 See id. at 22-25 (listing the various statutes of limitations in Title 18). 
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Whether a court would adopt a novel tolling rule to address the statute of 
limitations problem discussed herein would depend on the relative weight it 
places on the federal law policies implemented by, and the statute of 
limitations interests harmed by, its use of judicial tolling in the circumstances 
of our hypothetical case. In addition to the historical and precedential 
considerations described above, this weighing would likely also depend on 
certain practical considerations such as the crimes charged and the President’s 
response to the preceding investigation and indictment. Ultimately, the 
outcome of this weighing is uncertain, and should not be relied on to hold the 
President accountable when he or she engages in criminal behavior. Thus, 
prosecutors should seek alternative solutions to the statute of limitations 
problem to ensure that the President’s temporary relief from criminal process 
does not place him or her above the law. 
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Having concluded that a tolling rule may not be available to extend the 
statute of limitations for a crime committed by a President immune from 
criminal prosecution, I next discuss two potential solutions to this problem 
for prosecutors: (1) filing an indictment against the President under seal, and 
(2) creating a statutory tolling rule that would cover this scenario. 
A. Sealed Indictment 
One solution to the statute of limitations problem discussed herein is for 
prosecutors to issue an indictment against the President within the 
limitations period—which, for our purposes, we assume lies wholly within 
the President’s elected term or terms—but request that the indictment be 
sealed until the President leaves office. Some commentators have proposed 
this solution, concluding that the issuing and sealing of the indictment would 
toll the applicable statute of limitations period.202 Three questions must be 
answered to determine the viability of this solution: (1) under what 
circumstances may an indictment be sealed?; (2) does filing an indictment 
under seal toll the applicable statute of limitations?; and (3) does 
implementation of this solution violate any of the policies militating against 
presidential indictability? I take up each of these questions in turn. 
 
202 See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider, How Mueller Can Protect the Investigation—Even if He is Fired, 
POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/21/robert-mueller-
russia-probe-protection-218065 [https://perma.cc/P3XF-GARD] (“A sealed indictment would also 
ensure that the statute of limitations for crimes Trump might be charged with would not expire.”); 
Callan, supra note 52 (suggesting that Special Counsel Mueller, if unable to indict President Trump 
while in office, could seek to file an indictment under seal, “[t]he issuance and sealing [of which] 
would ‘toll’ the [applicable] statute from expiring”). 
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1. When Can an Indictment be Sealed? 
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure vests the authority to 
seal an indictment with the magistrate judge to whom an indictment is 
returned: 
SEALED INDICTMENT. The magistrate judge to whom an indictment is 
returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is 
in custody or has been released pending trial. The clerk must then seal the 
indictment, and no person may disclose the indictment’s existence except as 
necessary to issue or execute a warrant or summons.203 
However, the Rule itself provides little direction on how and when a 
magistrate judge may exercise this authority. Thus, it was left up to the courts 
to determine its scope. In United States v. Michael, one of the first cases 
interpreting Rule 6(e)(4), the defendant was charged with violating certain 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act in an indictment returned by the grand jury 
and sealed four days before the statute of limitations was set to expire.204 The 
defendant argued that the indictment should be dismissed because it was not 
lawfully sealed.205 The Third Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that 
Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e) authorizes indictment to be kept secret during 
the time required to take the defendant into custody. If such secrecy may 
lawfully be imposed in that situation we see nothing unlawful in the court 
imposing secrecy in other circumstances which in the exercise of a sound 
discretion it finds call for such action.206 
Thus, while the Rule could fairly be read to limit sealing to situations 
requiring secrecy before apprehension of the accused person, the court found 
that it could be extended to other circumstances requiring secrecy “in the 
exercise of a sound discretion.”207 
This holding was adopted and refined by the Second Circuit in two 
seminal cases in this area of the law: United States v. Southland Corp.208 and 
United States v. Srulowitz.209 In Southland, the government charged a bribery 
and tax evasion scheme among executives of Southland Corporation and the 
company’s attorney.210 The charging indictment was returned by the grand 
jury two days before expiration of the limitations period, and was sealed 
 
203 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4). 
204 180 F.2d 55, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1949). 
205 Id. at 57. 
206 Id. (footnote omitted). 
207 Id. 
208 760 F.2d 1366, 1379-80 (2d Cir. 1985). 
209 819 F.2d 37, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1987). 
210 Southland, 760 F.2d at 1369. 
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pursuant to the government’s need for additional time to obtain testimony 
from a cooperating witness.211 Similar to the defendant in Michael, here, the 
defendant charged that the indictment was invalid because it could not be 
sealed except when necessary to maintain secrecy until apprehension of the 
accused.212 The Second Circuit, citing Michael with approval, adopted a broad 
view of when an indictment may be sealed, concluding that such a request 
may be granted when “the public interest requires it,” or “for sound reasons 
of policy.”213 Moreover, the court adopted a highly deferential standard of 
review of the magistrate’s decision to seal: 
This is a point on which great deference should be accorded to the discretion of 
the magistrate, at least in the absence of any evidence of substantial prejudice to 
the defendant. The Government should be able, except in the most 
extraordinary cases, to rely on that decision rather than risk dismissal of an 
indictment, the sealing of which it might have been willing to forego, because 
an appellate court sees things differently, after the expenditure of vast resources 
at a trial and at a time when reindictment is by hypothesis impossible.214 
In Srulowitz, the defendant was charged with RICO violations and mail 
fraud in an indictment returned and sealed about a month before the statute of 
limitations ran on the charges.215 The government’s articulated reason for sealing 
the indictment was to maintain secrecy of the allegations while it attempted to 
locate the defendant and secure the cooperation of a crucial witness.216 The 
indictment was unsealed two months later, and the defendant asserted that it 
should be dismissed because it was not “found” within the five-year statute of 
limitations period.217 The Second Circuit held that the magistrate’s decision to 
seal would be upheld so long as “the prosecution can demonstrate that the 
decision to keep an indictment secret [was] informed by the exercise of sound 
discretion in the public interest.”218 The court further reasoned that an 
indictment was properly sealed so long as it is supported by “proper 
prosecutorial purposes,” which need not be articulated to the magistrate on the 
record when the indictment is sealed.219 The court also held that the defendant’s 
right to challenge the propriety of the sealing ex post was sufficient protection 
 
211 Id. at 1378. 
212 Id. at 1379. 
213 Id. at 1379-80 (emphasis omitted). 
214 Id. at 1380. 
215 United States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987). 
216 Id. 
217 Id at 39-40. 
218 Id. at 40. 
219 Id. at 41. 
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from abuse, and thus the government only must dictate the prosecutorial 
purposes for secrecy when the sealing is challenged by the defendant.220 
The standard adopted in Southland and Srulowitz, allowing a magistrate 
judge to seal an indictment for any proper prosecutorial purpose or where the 
public interest requires it, has been universally adopted by Circuit Courts 
throughout the country.221 Courts adopting this standard have identified a 
wide range of justifications for sealing that qualify under this broad rule, 
including the need to protect potential witnesses,222 the desire to avoid 
compromising an ongoing investigation223 or unrelated trial,224 out of concern 
 
220 Id. 
221 See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(4), a district court’s power to seal an indictment is broad; sealing an 
indictment is generally permitted when it is in the public interest or serves a legitimate law-
enforcement purpose.”); United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 858 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e look to 
the Government’s request to seal the indictment and evaluate that request to determine whether any 
legitimate prosecutorial purpose or public interest supports the sealing of the indictment.”); United 
States v. Thompson, 287 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2002) (“When the government fails to articulate 
a legitimate prosecutorial purpose . . . it violates Rule 6(e)(4).”); United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 
1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that an indictment is found when returned by the grand jury so 
long as it is “properly sealed for legitimate prosecutorial objectives.”); United States v. DiSalvo, 34 
F.3d 1204, 1218 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An indictment may be sealed for any legitimate law enforcement 
reason or where the public interest requires it.” (citing Michael, 180 F.2d at 57)); United States v. 
Sharpe, 995 F.2d 49, 52 (5th Cir. 1993) (“An indictment is properly sealed when the government 
requests that the magistrate judge seal the indictment for any legitimate prosecutorial objective or 
where the public interest otherwise requires it.” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. 
Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We agree with the other courts that have considered the 
question that, in keeping with the practice in effect at the time Rule 6(e)(4) was adopted, a 
magistrate may grant the government’s request to seal an indictment for any legitimate prosecutorial 
objective or where the public interest otherwise requires it.”(internal quotations omitted)); United 
States v. Lakin, 875 F.2d 168, 171 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e hold that a judicial officer may grant the 
government’s request to seal an indictment for any legitimate prosecutorial objective or where the 
public interest otherwise requires it.”); United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]he judicial officer may grant the Government’s motion to seal for any legitimate prosecutorial 
need . . . .”); ; United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 644, 647-48 (11th Cir. 1985) (approving of 
Southland’s finding that an indictment may be sealed when the public interest requires it or for sound 
reasons of policy). 
222 See, e.g., Ellis, 622 F.3d at 793 (“Sealing the indictment was a reasonable measure to protect 
the identity, security, and testimony of the witness in the Indiana case.”); Wright, 343 F.3d at 858 
(“The protection of [the witness] . . . falls within the range of permissible reasons for sealing an 
indictment.”); United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 81 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The protection of a key 
prosecution witness undoubtedly qualifies as a legitimate prosecutorial objective.”); Bracy, 67 F.3d 
at 1426 (stating that the violant nature of a criminal organization justified sealing the indictment 
due to safety concerns of potential witnesses); United States v. Upton, 339 F. Supp. 2d 190, 194-95 
(D. Mass. 2004) (stating that the threat to a potential witness in a homicide investigation justified 
sealing of the indictment). 
223 See Wright, 343 F.3d at 858 (“[T]he need to avoid compromising an ongoing investigation 
falls within the range of permissible reasons for sealing an indictment.”). 
224 See DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 1219 (holding that concerns of adverse publicity towards an unrelated 
ongoing trial justify sealing an indictment).. 
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for pre-trial publicity before all of the named defendants are located,225 or to 
prevent the defendant from obstructing justice.226 
Returning to the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this 
Section—where a prosecutor seeking to indict the President first files the 
indictment under seal, and then publicizes it when the President leaves 
office—should the President seek to dismiss the indictment because it was 
not properly sealed, he or she would likely frame the prosecutorial purpose 
for sealing as merely to toll the statute of limitations for the charged offense. 
Courts are conflicted on whether a bare desire to toll the statute of 
limitations is a legitimate purpose for sealing an indictment.227 However, the 
prosecutor in such a case could likely frame his or her justification more 
broadly as the need to preserve prosecution against a person entitled to 
temporary immunity. This would allow the prosecutor to lean on policy 
arguments on both sides of the presidential immunity debate. On one hand, 
sealing the indictment is necessary to prevent the practical problems 
(identified in Section I.C, supra) that arise when a President is indicted—
most importantly, the diversion of the President’s time and energy from 
performance of his or her official duties. On the other hand, preserving 
charges against the President is necessary for upholding the rule of law and 
preventing the President from evading criminal charges solely through 
election to the office.228 Given the low bar that has been set regarding for 
 
225 See Sharpe, 995 F.2d at 52 (citing the concern for pre-trial publicity as a valid reason to seal 
an indictment); Richard, 943 F.2d at 119 (noting that one of the defendants could receive excess 
publicity and potentially jeopardize taking the other defendants into custody). 
226 See United States v. Szilvagyi, 417 Fed. App’x 472, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2011)(“In this case, the 
district court determined that the government articulated a legitimate prosecutorial purpose—
namely, a concern that [the defendant] would once again attempt to obstruct justice—in its request 
to seal the naturalization fraud indictment.”). 
227 Compare United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 644, 648-49 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Tolling the 
statute of limitations on charges of conspiracy to import with intent to distribute thousands of 
pounds of marijuana is arguably required by the public interest and supported by sound reasons of 
policy.”), with United States v. Gigante, 436 F. Supp. 2d 647, 659-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the 
government’s need for more time to investigate the charges as a legitimate purpose for sealing 
because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to render the statute of limitations in criminal cases 
meaningless.”), and United States v. Rogers, 781 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding that 
“a unilateral extension by the government of the limitations period under the guise of ‘gathering 
evidence’” was not a “legitimate prosecutorial objective.”). 
228 Commentators arguing in favor of presidential immunity from indictment often stress that 
their position has no impact on upholding the rule of law because the President can always be 
indicted the minute he or she leaves office—through impeachment or otherwise. See, e.g., 2000 OLC 
Memo, supra note 11, at 257 (“[R]ecognizing a temporary immunity would not subvert the important 
interest in maintaining the ‘rule of law.’ . . . [T]he immunity from indictment and criminal 
prosecution for a sitting President would generally result in the delay, but not the forbearance, of 
any criminal trial.”); Amar & Kalt, supra note 24, at 11 (“Th[e] privilege [against indictment] does 
not place Presidents above the law; they can be held accountable for their actions after they leave 
office . . . .”); Howe, supra note 36, at 86 (“[B]ecause the [President’s] immunity [from indictment] 
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what reasons an indictment may be sealed, and the strong public interest in 
upholding the rule of law, filing a sealed indictment against the President to 
preserve prosecution until after he or she leaves office should be permitted 
under Rule 6(e)(4). 
2. Does Sealing an Indictment Toll the Statute of Limitations? 
18 U.S.C. § 3282 provides that “no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or 
punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found . . . within 
five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”229 This 
provision stipulates a five-year limitations period for most federal offenses, 
although some offenses call for different periods or none at all.230 Most other 
limitations provisions in the federal criminal code likewise contain the 
requirement that an indictment be “found” within the prescribed 
timeframe.231 Thus, the question arises as to when a sealed indictment is 
 
would be temporary, it would not imply that the President is ‘above the law.’ . . . Even for charges 
that did not spur impeachment, prosecution could occur when the President otherwise left office.”). 
229 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
230 See generally DOYLE, supra note 70 (detailing exceptions to the statute of limitations for 
federal crimes). 
231 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 247(g) (2018)(“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . 
unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 7 years after the date 
on which the offense was committed.”); 18 U.S.C. § 249(d)(1) (2018)( “[N]o person shall be 
prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless the indictment for such offense is found, or the 
information for such offense is instituted, not later than 7 years after the date on which the offense 
was committed”); 18 U.S.C. § 3286(a) (2018)(“[N]o person shall be prosecuted, tried, or 
punished . . . unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within 8 years after the 
offense was committed.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3291 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 103-322)(“No person shall 
be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted 
within ten years after the commission of the offense.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3295 (2018)(“No person shall be 
prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted 
not later than 10 years after the date on which the offense was committed.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3301(b) 
(2018)(“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for a securities fraud offense, unless the 
indictment is found or the information is instituted within 6 years after the commission of the 
offense.”); 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2018)( “No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless 
the indictment is found or the information instituted within 3 years next after the commission of 
the offense . . . .”); 31 U.S.C. § 333(d)(2) (2018)(“No person may be prosecuted, tried, or 
punished . . . unless the indictment is found or the information instituted during the 3-year period 
beginning on the date of the violation.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2278 (2018)(“[N]o individual or person shall 
be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense . . . unless the indictment is found or the 
information is instituted within ten years next after such offense shall have been committed.”). Some 
other statute of limitations provisions require an indictment to be “returned.” See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3293 (2018)( “No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless the indictment is 
returned or the information is filed within 10 years after the commission of the offense.”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3294 (2018)(“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless the indictment is 
returned or the information is filed within 20 years after the commission of the offense.”). Others 
require it be “filed” within the limitations period. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3300 (2018)( “No person may 
be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . . unless the indictment or the information is filed not later than 
10 years after the commission of the offense.”). 
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“found”—(1) when it is returned to the magistrate and sealed, or (2) when it 
is unsealed? As seen in the cases cited above, most challenges to the sealing 
of an indictment are raised by defendants as part of a statute of limitations 
defense, where the indictment at issue is unsealed after expiration of the 
limitations period.232 Here, defendants often argue that an indictment is time 
barred because it is not “found” within the meaning of § 3282 et al. until it is 
unsealed. As with the issue addressed above, the answer to this question has 
largely produced agreement among the Courts of Appeal stemming from the 
Second Circuit’s opinions in Southland and Srulowitz. 
As noted above, prosecutors in Southland charged the defendants in an 
indictment that was returned by the grand jury two days before expiration of 
the statute of limitations.233 The indictment was sealed on the same day, 
before being unsealed forty-one days later when the government declined to 
pursue additional testimony from a cooperating witness.234 The defendants 
subsequently argued that the indictment should be dismissed as time barred 
because it was not “found” until it was unsealed—thirty-nine days after the 
limitations period expired.235 While failing to expand on the issue, the court 
rejected this argument, finding that the applicable statute of limitations 
provisions did not require that the indictment be made public.236 
In Srulowitz, the charging indictment was handed up and ordered sealed 
twenty-six days before the limitations period expired.237 It was kept sealed 
for two months, and the defendants likewise challenged the indictment as 
time barred.238 The District Court held that the indictment was not found 
within the five-year limitations period fixed by § 3282 because it was “found” 
on the date it was unsealed rather than the date it was filed.239 The Second 
Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that an indictment is “found” when it is 
returned by the grand jury and filed, unless the defendant can demonstrate 
substantial actual prejudice occurring between the date of sealing and the date 
of unsealing.240 Thus, “when a sealed indictment is not opened until after the 
expiration of the time allowed by the statute of limitations for the prosecution 
 
232 See John Stinson, Secret Indictments: How to Discourage Them, How to Make Them Fair, 2 
DREXEL L. REV. 104, 124 (2009) (“Most defendant challenges to seals involve situations where the 
indictment remained secret beyond a federal statute of limitations . . . .”). 
233 United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1985). 
234 Id. at 1378-79. 
235 Id. at 1379. As the charges were for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and various 
tax offenses, the statute of limitations periods in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 and 26 U.S.C. § 6531 applied. 
Both of these provisions require the indictment be “found” within the relevant period. 
236 Id. 
237 United States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 38. 
240 Id. at 40. 
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of an offense, the statute ordinarily is not a bar to prosecution.”241 Again, the 
Second Circuit’s standard received widespread acceptance among sister 
circuits, who similarly concluded that filing an indictment under seal tolled 
the statute of limitations unless the defendant could demonstrate actual 
prejudice resulting from the delay.242 At the same time, courts have 
recognized that a defendant’s right to repose may be implicated when the 
government keeps an indictment under seal for an unreasonable time, even 
in the absence of a showing of actual prejudice, and thus, “the government’s 
ability to toll the statute of limitations by sealing and [sic] indictment is not 
unlimited.”243 Courts faced with statute of limitations challenges by 
defendants who are the subject of indictments kept under seal for lengthy 
periods have been willing to dismiss the indictment when the government 
fails to comply with the terms of the sealing order244 or keeps an indictment 
 
241 Id. 
242 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 857 (6th Cir. 2003) (declaring that “[w]e 
follow the rule in our decision in Burnett and the majority of our sister circuits in finding that a timely 
filed and properly sealed indictment tolls the statute of limitations” unless the defendant shows actual 
prejudice); United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1218-19 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A] defendant is required 
to demonstrate substantial prejudice in order to be entitled to the dismissal of an indictment sealed 
beyond the statute of limitations . . . .”); United States v. Sharpe, 995 F.2d 49, 50 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We 
conclude that a properly sealed indictment does indeed toll the statute of limitations, absent a showing 
of substantive and actual prejudice.”); United States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(concluding that “a defendant may justify dismissal of an indictment sealed beyond the limitation 
period” upon “a showing of substantial, irreparable, actual prejudice” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)); United States v. Lakin, 875 F.2d 168, 170 (8th Cir. 1989) (“When an indictment 
is properly sealed, the date of return, rather than the date of unsealing, ordinarily is the time that the 
indictment is found for purposes of section 3282.”); United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 320-23 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that an indictment was timely filed when unsealed after the statutory limitations 
period expired because the defendants failed to show actual prejudice); United States v. Edwards, 777 
F.2d 644, 647-49 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that “[a]n indictment sealed pursuant to Fed.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(4) 
is timely even though the defendant is not arrested and the indictment is not made public until after 
the end of the statutory limitations period” and rejecting the defendant’s time bar claim because they 
failed to show actual prejudice (footnote omitted)). The Tenth Circuit has held that an indictment is 
found whenever it is returned by the grand jury, regardless of any actual prejudice realized by the 
defendant; “[w]hether the indictment is then sealed is thus irrelevant for statute of limitations 
purposes.” United States v. Thompson, 287 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit 
noted the split between the Tenth and other circuits but declined to take a position on the issue. 
United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2010). 
243 Sharpe, 995 F.2d at 51 n.5. 
244 The court in Upton stated, 
[T]his Court allowed the Government’s motion to continue seal of the indictment, 
but restricted that allowance to thirty days. The Court specified that if the 
Government wanted to file for a further continuance, it would have to provide a 
detailed status report. When the Government failed either to file a status report or to 
request a continuance long after the thirty days had passed, the authority to seal the 
indictment expired, and the statute of limitations again began to run. 
United States v. Upton, 339 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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sealed beyond the period justified by legitimate prosecutorial needs.245 In 
such a case, the statute of limitations period may be deemed to begin running 
again once the period needed to satisfy the government’s legitimate 
prosecutorial purpose has expired.246 
We once again return to the hypothetical case presented at the beginning 
of this Section—wherein a prosecutor files a sealed indictment against the 
President—and ask whether this would suffice to toll the applicable statute of 
limitations under current doctrine. Here, it is unlikely the President would 
be able to show actual prejudice as a result of keeping the indictment under 
seal absent exigent circumstances. Indeed, the whole purpose of sealing the 
indictment in this case would be out of consideration for the importance of 
the President’s position and the desire not to distract him or her from the 
performance of official duties. If any party is prejudiced it is the prosecutor, 
who is forced to delay prosecution of the President, thereby risking, inter alia, 
the spoliation of evidence or the death of a key witness.247 Furthermore, 
assuming the prosecutor promptly unseals the indictment after the President 
leaves office, the President would be unable to show an unreasonable delay by 
the prosecutor that may justify dismissal in the absence of actual prejudice. 
The prosecutorial purpose in sealing the indictment is to preserve 
prosecution against a person who is entitled to temporary immunity. This 
purpose remains legitimate so long as immunity obtains, and thus, even if an 
indictment against the President is sealed months or years before he or she 
leaves office, prosecutors cannot be charged with an unreasonable delay in 
unsealing it until the immunity is extinguished; that is, when the President’s 
term expires. Under current doctrine, filing a sealed indictment should toll 
the statute of limitations for a charge that prosecutors seek to bring against 
the President once he or she leaves office. 
 
245 As one court noted, 
Given the strong policy of notifying criminal defendants of the charges against them 
so that they may prepare a defense, the Second Circuit held that the limitations period 
may be extended by sealing the indictment only within reasonable limits. This 
standard permits an extension only to the degree necessary to accommodate the 
prosecutorial interests that the sealing of the indictment legitimately furthers. 
United States v. Deglomini, 111 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also United States v. Sherwood, 38 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D. Conn. 1964) (“Inasmuch 
as the sealing of this indictment was extended by action initiated by the Government and continued 
for a period of thirteen (13) months and four (4) days from the date of the grand jury’s return, the 
Court presumes prejudice . . . .”). 
246 Upton, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
247 Many of the same risks identified in Section II.A, supra, as impairing a person’s ability to 
successfully defend against old charges would also apply to a prosecutor who is unable to bring such 
charges until long after an offense is committed, as we hypothesize here. 
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3. Is Filing a Sealed Indictment Consistent with the Reasons Supporting 
Presidential Immunity? 
Finally, I consider whether this solution would violate the principles and 
considerations that require presidential immunity, discussed in Part I. This 
analysis is necessary to prevent the assertion that sealing an indictment is an 
unsatisfactory solution because it does not alleviate the problems with 
publicly indicting a President. I conclude that sealing an indictment against 
the President successfully responds to commentators’ concerns with 
Presidential indictment, and, when considered together with the analysis in 
the two preceding Sections, is therefore a viable solution to the statute of 
limitations problem. 
The chief practical concern with presidential indictment stressed by 
commentators is its potential to distract the President from the performance of 
his or her official duties. Given the importance of the President in our 
constitutional structure and the nondelegable nature of certain critical decisions 
entrusted to the office, it is argued that permitting the President to be indicted 
and subject to criminal sanctions is both impractical and unworkable. 
The source of this distraction would be on multiple fronts. First, facing 
criminal charges would certainly cause the President some degree of internal 
strife. The possibility of being subject to criminal sanctions, not to mention 
imprisonment, would weigh heavily on anyone’s mind, no less the President. 
In addition, it is fair to assume that the President would be preoccupied, at least 
in part, by the looming threat of embarrassment and political ridicule that 
would inevitably follow a conviction. Second, the President would need to set 
aside time to prepare and execute his defense with his attorneys and appear at 
the trial and any hearings where his presence is thereafter required. While the 
amount of time needed to prepare and carry out his or her defense may vary 
with the seriousness of the charges, it is fair to assume these activities would 
impact the performance of official duties to some degree. Third, the mere 
accusation of criminal behavior in an indictment may delegitimize the 
President in the eyes of foreign and domestic leaders, thereby impairing his or 
her ability to operate effectively.248 Fourth, media attention on the President’s 
 
248 While the United States prides itself on the existence of a presumption of innocence for 
criminal defendants, there are legitimate questions of whether this principle obtains in practice. See, 
e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Myth of the Presumption of Innocence, 94 TEX. L. REV. See also 178, 179 
(2016) (“The American presumption of innocence is more of an ideal than real.”); Nicholas Scurich 
& Richard S. John, Jurors’ Presumption of Innocence, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 187 (2017) (finding 
empirically that “compared to when a suspect had been merely named, jurors thought that the 
individual was significantly more likely to be guilty after a detective referred the case to the district 
attorney and when he was formally charged and thus a criminal defendant”). 
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prosecution would be overwhelming,249 and the President would likely face 
questions about his or her case in every interaction with the press. This swarm 
of attention could further undermine the President’s authority.250 All of these 
realities would combine to create a significant diversion from official duties 
when the President is charged with a crime. However, the use of a sealed 
indictment responds well to these concerns. 
When an indictment is sealed, “no person may disclose the indictment’s 
existence except as necessary to issue or execute a warrant or summons.”251 
The existence and contents of a sealed indictment are thus kept secret, and 
the government does no further prosecution of the accused, until it is 
unsealed. The secrecy of an indictment filed against the President would 
alleviate the concerns about distraction discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
First, the President would not be internally burdened given he or she would 
be unaware of the pending charges. Second, the President and his lawyers 
would not be taking time to prepare a defense as they would have no 
knowledge of the accusations in the indictment until it is unsealed. Third, 
none of the President’s contemporaries would have reason to assume disfavor 
of the President given the charges in the indictment are not public. And 
fourth, assuming existence of the indictment is also hidden from the media, 
there would be no story to cover. Of course, all of the above contentions 
depend on the sealed indictment in fact remaining a secret until the President 
leaves office, which may be a difficult task given the enormous value of this 
information and the many actors that could be aware of it.252 But assuming 
 
249 See, e.g., Stefano L. Molea, Opinion: Media Coverage Can Undermine the Presumption of Innocence, 
TIMES OF SAN DIEGO (Mar. 2, 2018), https://timesofsandiego.com/opinion/2018/03/02/opinion-media-
coverage-can-undermine-the-presumption-of-innocence/ [https://perma.cc/8NUN-3KHF] (“Whether it’s 
a coach, a professional athlete, actor, law enforcement officer, or politician, a high-profile arrest triggers a 
flurry of reports and news coverage that capitalize on the sensational.”). 
250 Pretrial media coverage of criminal cases may also contribute to the practical failure of the 
presumption of innocence. See Richard V. Ericson, The Decline of Innocence, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. 
REV. 367, 373 (1994) (“[I]t now seems evident that the mass media join with the criminal justice 
institution in making little pretense about the presumption of innocence.”); Ariana Tanoos, Shielding 
the Presumption of Innocence from Pretrial Media Coverage, 50 IND. L. REV. 997, 997 (2017) (“[P]retrial 
publicity of criminal cases is eroding the presumption [of innocence] . . . .”). 
251 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4). 
252 Grand jury leaks are always a concern, even in lesser cases. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, How 
Racy Emails and a Grand Jury Leak Brought Down Rising Political Start Kathleen Kane, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/16/how-racy-emails-
and-a-grand-jury-leak-brought-down-a-political-rising-star/?utm_term=.e343afa58b09 
[https://perma.cc/HV85-9T57] (detailing charges against former Pennsylvania Attorney General 
Kathleen Kane for leaking grand jury information to the press). As is the potential for inadvertent 
disclosure of a sealed indictment. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Adam Goldman, & Michael S. Schmidt, 
Assange is Secretly Charged in U.S., Prosecutors Mistakenly Reveal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/julian-assange-indictment-wikileaks.html 
[https://perma.cc/3P72-3CBN] (detailing the mistaken revelation of a sealed indictment filed against 
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in an unrelated case). 
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the procedures mandated by Rule 6(e)(4) are followed, the indictment should 
be kept secret until it is unsealed, thus preventing the president from being 
distracted for the duration of his or her term. 
Filing an indictment under seal also responds well to other theoretical and 
practical considerations favoring presidential immunity. Because permitting 
a sealed indictment does not go so far as to authorize criminal process against 
the President while he or she remains in office, prosecutors will not be 
motivated to bring forth politically-influenced charges, which largely become 
useless once the President is no longer serving. Filing a sealed indictment 
also does not act as de facto removal and improperly encroach on the 
impeachment process. Congress could still choose to impeach and remove the 
President while an indictment is under seal, or prosecution for the charges in 
the indictment will remain dormant until the President voluntarily leaves 
office. Moreover, preserving prosecution against the President by filing a 
sealed indictment would prevent the President from escaping justice and 
further the view that the President is not above the law, increasing the 
legitimacy of the office at home and abroad. 
Because filing a sealed indictment against the President (1) offers a 
proper purpose for sealing an indictment under the courts’ interpretation 
of Rule 6(e)(4), (2) would toll the statute of limitations for the offense 
charged, and (3) is consistent with the theoretical and practical 
considerations demanding presidential immunity, it is a viable solution to 
the statute of limitations problem.253 
B. Congressional Action 
Another solution to the statute of limitations problem discussed herein is 
for Congress to pass a statutory tolling rule that prosecutors could invoke in 
a hypothetical case against the former President. Some commentators have 
called for this solution to be implemented by Congress now in order to 
prevent the statute of limitations problem before it arises.254 This “could be 
 
253 An additional issue noted by Professor Sunstein is that the ability of prosecutors to criminally 
pursue the President for acts committed while in office may depend on whether the acts are considered 
“official” within the meaning prescribed by Nixon v. Fitzgerald. As Sunstein argues, this opinion may 
dictate that prosecutors are unable to indict the president on the basis of official acts that violate the 
law even when he or she leaves office. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 166 (“Nixon v. Fitzgerald creates 
a rule of absolute immunity from civil lawsuits for actions undertaken as part of a president’s official 
duties, and it may follow that if official duties really are involved, a former president enjoys absolute 
immunity from criminal prosecution as well.”). I don’t expand on this potential issue here, but note 
that a criminal act and an “official” could be considered mutually exclusive. 
254 See 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 11, at 256 & n.34 (arguing that Congress could overcome 
any problem posed by the applicable statute of limitations by imposing its own tolling rule); 
Freedman, supra note 21, at 682 & 726 (1999) (“If, on the other hand, the President does have 
immunity, it would certainly be wise to provide by explicit legislation for the tolling of the otherwise 
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done without pre-judging the constitutional issue by a statute providing in 
general terms for tolling with respect to any officer of the government whose 
official position rendered him or her immune from indictment.”255 
In some ways, this proposal is both a simple and complex solution to the 
statute of limitations problem. On one hand, Congress has already 
established various rules that suspend or toll the running of limitations 
periods in a number of circumstances, such as “when the accused is a fugitive 
or when the case involves charges of child abuse, bankruptcy, wartime fraud 
against the government, or DNA evidence.”256 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3292 
allows the government to suspend the running of the statute of limitations 
for an offense if evidence of the offense is located in a foreign country. To be 
entitled to tolling under this rule, the government must file an application 
with the court requesting suspension of the limitations period and 
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence of the 
offense is located in a foreign country.257 If the application is approved by the 
court, the limitations period can then be suspended for up to three years.258 
Congress could pass a similar statute allowing for suspension of the 
limitations period whenever the government seeks to indict a public official 
who is otherwise entitled to temporary immunity, until the official’s elected 
term expires. This would be a straightforward solution to the statute of 
limitations problem and prevent prosecutors from having to keep a sealed 
indictment under wraps for an extended period, as the prior proposal would 
require. On the other hand, political polarization has made it difficult for 
Congress to agree on anything, which presents a practical issue whenever any 
legal problem demands a legislative solution. A congressional stalemate may 
be even more likely to prevail in response to the tolling rule I have suggested 
here, given it would most likely be raised at a time when the President is 
already under investigation, sparking backlash from his or her party in the 
face of their leader being indicted. Thus, while this solution is the simplest 
one to the statute of limitations problem, whether it can realistically be 
implemented likely depends on the existing political climate and 
Congressional makeup at any given time. 
Nevertheless, to the extent lawmakers successfully adopted the statutory 
tolling rule suggested here, it would be consistent with the theoretical and 
practical considerations that demand the President be immune from indictment. 
While the President may be distracted knowing that prosecutors invoking such 
 
applicable statutes of limitations.”). Enacting a tolling rule before a President commits an offense 
that would be subject to it would also avoid a potential ex post facto problem. 
255 Freedman, supra note 21, at 726. 
256 DOYLE, supra note 70, at i. 
257 18 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1) (2018). 
258 Id. § 3292(c)(1). 
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a rule may be waiting to indict him or her as soon as he or she steps out of office, 
any prosecution would not begin until the President leaves office.259 In addition, 
the President would not have to dedicate time to the preparation of a defense 
until after his or her term expires. Any media craze over the trial would also be 
postponed, and given that prosecution cannot be commenced until the President 
leaves office, it is unlikely that prosecutors would be motivated to bring 
politically motivated charges. Finally, because the President would not be 
subject to compulsory criminal process while serving, implementing a statutory 
tolling rule would not encroach on the role of impeachment. 
CONCLUSION 
Commitment to the rule of law has been a fundamental tenet of this country 
since the founding. According to this doctrine, the criminal law must be equally 
applied to all people, including the President. However, this principle risks 
being violated when we assume that the President is immune from indictment 
while in office. That being the case, the President may be able to run out the 
limitations period for an offense if his or her term ends after its expiration and 
Congress refuses to impeach. While many commentators in favor of 
presidential immunity have argued that a court could toll the applicable statute 
of limitations to solve this problem, an analysis of caselaw on judicial tolling 
dictates that this remedy may not be available. With respect to equitable tolling, 
the history and principles of criminal law dictate that the doctrine is unavailable 
in a criminal case. And even if it could be applied, precedent on equitable 
tolling dictates that it may not be available merely as a result of the President’s 
temporary criminal immunity. With respect to tolling invoked to implement 
the policies and procedures of other federal law, while a court would have strong 
interests to point to in adopting a novel tolling rule to solve the statute of 
limitations problem addressed here, the fundamental principles of criminal 
statutes of limitation may likewise dictate that this remedy is unavailable. 
Because of the uncertainty regarding a court’s ability to toll the applicable 
limitations period in a hypothetical case against a former President raising a 
statute of limitations defense, it would be prudent to implement alternative 
solutions to solve the statute of limitations problem. Two solutions that 
effectively address this problem are filing an indictment against the President 
 
259 One worry here is that if the President knows that he or she will be indicted the minute he 
or she leaves office, the President may attempt to issue a self-pardon. However, most commentators 
opining on the issue of self-pardons have concluded that the President may not pardon himself or 
herself. See generally Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-
Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779 (1996) (arguing against the self-pardon power); see also SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 33, at 166-67 (reasoning that the Founders, deeply skeptical of monarch-like powers, did not 
intend to allow the President to be “judge in his own cause”). 
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under seal, and the creation by Congress of a statutory tolling rule that would 
allow for suspension of the limitations period while the President benefits from 
temporary criminal immunity. 
